Importing a crafted backup leads to project restriction bypass
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 5.0.7, 5.21.5, 6.8.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In Canonical LXD before 6.8, the backup import path validates project restrictions against backup/index.yaml in the supplied tar archive but creates the instance from backup/container/backup.yaml, a separate file in the same archive that is never checked against project restrictions. An authenticated remote attacker with instance-creation permission in a restricted project can craft a backup archive where backup.yaml carries restricted settings such as security.privileged=true or raw.lxc directives, bypassing all project restriction enforcement and allowing full host compromise.
Timeline
- CVE published
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- lxd
From 4.12.0 · fixed in 5.0.7; From 5.1.0 · fixed in 5.21.5; From 6.0.0 · fixed in 6.8.0
- github.com/canonical/lxdGo
From 0.0.0-20210305023314-538ac3df036e · through 0.0.0-20260226085519-736f34afb267
- github.com/canonical/lxdGo
From 0.0.0-20210305023314-538ac3df036e