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Unbounded response body buffering in Streamable HTTP clients

Exploited
No known exploitation
Fix
Fixed in 3.9.0
Who is exposed
Not reported

Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.9.0.

Published
Last modified
16/100 · provisional
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

The built-in Streamable HTTP clients in rmcp (the reqwest and Unix socket clients) read HTTP response bodies into memory with no size limit in releases before the fix. A malicious or compromised MCP server can send a never-ending response, such as a chunked stream of whitespace, during `initialize` before any authentication, which exhausts memory and terminates the host application.

Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.

Read the original description

Before 3.9.0, the built-in Streamable HTTP clients in rmcp read non-streaming HTTP response bodies into memory with no size limit. Both the reqwest client (transport-streamable-http-client-reqwest) and the Unix socket client (transport-streamable-http-client-unix-socket) were affected:

  • application/json responses to POST requests were read in full before parsing.
  • Non-2xx responses were read in full for error reporting.

A malicious or compromised MCP server can answer with a body that never ends, for example a chunked application/json response that streams whitespace. The client buffers it until the process runs out of memory. This works during initialize, before any authentication. On desktop or agent hosts, this terminates the whole host application.

Server-sent event streams are not affected. Each event is already capped by max_sse_event_size, and events are not accumulated.

The flaw was corrected in 3.9.0. Successful JSON bodies are limited to 16 MiB and non-success bodies to 64 KiB. Bytes are counted while streaming, after decompression. An oversized Content-Length is rejected before the body is read, and an oversized body is rejected with StreamableHttpError::ResponseBodyTooLarge instead of being truncated.

If you cannot upgrade, use a custom StreamableHttpClient that enforces a response body limit, or connect only to trusted MCP servers.

cve.now Index

16Pcve.now Index 16 of 100 · methodology v3 · provisional
  • Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
  • Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
  • Reach16/20rmcp: 2.1M downloads a week
  • Severity?/10Unknown. No CVSS score or vendor rating
  • No patch0/5No signal

What would change the score

  • Would score about 71 if added to CISA KEV
  • Would score about 66 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
  • Would score about 38 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed

Impact

  • Widely used

    rmcp has 2.1m weekly downloads.Source: crates.io

What to do

  • Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.9.0.

Timeline

  1. Advisory published4 days
  2. Record last updated

Affected versions

  • rmcpcrates.io

    From 0.2.0 · fixed in 3.9.0

    Fixed in 3.9.0 (released Nov 5, 2026, the day of disclosure).

    The latest release, 3.9.0, is not affected.

Evidence 3

  1. Advisory
  2. Repository
  3. Link

Corrections

None so far.

Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.

Questions about RUSTSEC-2026-0462

Is RUSTSEC-2026-0462 being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data

Which versions are affected by RUSTSEC-2026-0462?

rmcp (crates.io): from 0.2.0 before 3.9.0.Source: cve.now feed data

How do I fix RUSTSEC-2026-0462?

Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.9.0.Source: cve.now feed data