- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.3.0
- Who is exposed
- Not reported
Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.3.0.
- Last modified
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 10/100 · provisional
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The `kv-mem`, `kv-surrealkv`, and `kv-rocksdb` storage backends can read and write freed memory when a pool worker keeps using borrowed data after the future that owns it has been leaked. Safe code can trigger this by leaking the future, with no `unsafe` code at the call site, and it affects operations such as `count`, `scan`, `compact`, and point reads and writes.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
Read the original description
The kv-mem, kv-surrealkv and kv-rocksdb backends move non-'static borrowed state into affinity-pool closures through affinitypool::spawn_local: a tokio::sync::MutexGuard<Option<TransactionInner>>, &Transaction, &mut ScanStateKeys/Vals, &mut dyn KeyVisitor/ValVisitor, RwLockReadGuard, and a ReadOptions holding a raw rocksdb_snapshot_t*. In affinitypool 0.7.0 spawn_local is safe and erases the 'pool lifetime via async_task::Builder::spawn_unchecked; the only thing keeping it sound is the Drop implementation of the returned future, which blocks until the worker stops using the borrows.
Safe code can leak that future (mem::forget, Box::leak, ManuallyDrop, a reference cycle, or a leaked enclosing future). The borrows then end while the pool worker still uses them, producing a use-after-free on the transaction allocation; AddressSanitizer reports a read of freed mutex data and a write when the worker unlocks the freed tokio::sync::Mutex on the pool thread. No unsafe is required at the call site, and the affected methods include count, keys/keysr, scan/scanr, compact, shutdown, point reads and writes, and cursor iteration.
3.3.0 upgrades to affinitypool 0.8.0, where spawn_local is an unsafe function and the caller must uphold the leak-freedom invariant (commit 8156ff69).
cve.now Index
- Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
- Reach10/20Affects crates.io packages
- Severity?/10Unknown. No CVSS score or vendor rating
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 65 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 60 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 32 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed
Impact
- Widely used
surrealdb has 44.7k weekly downloads.Source: crates.io
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.3.0.
Timeline
- Advisory published18 days
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- surrealdbcrates.io
From 0.0.0-0 · fixed in 3.3.0
Fixed in 3.3.0 (released Sep 24, 2026, 25 days before disclosure).
The latest release, 4.0.0, is not affected.
Evidence 3
- Advisory
- Repository
- Link
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about RUSTSEC-2026-0453
Is RUSTSEC-2026-0453 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
Which versions are affected by RUSTSEC-2026-0453?
surrealdb (crates.io): from 0.0.0-0 before 3.3.0.Source: cve.now feed data
How do I fix RUSTSEC-2026-0453?
Upgrade to a fixed version: 3.3.0.Source: cve.now feed data