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Rejected authentication challenges can poison the Key Vault scope cache

Exploited
No known exploitation
Fix
Fixed in 1.0.1, 1.1.0-beta.2
Who is exposed
Not reported

Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 1.0.1, 1.1.0-beta.2.

Published
Last modified
10/100 · provisional
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

Affected versions of azure_security_keyvault_certificates cache an authentication scope from a rejected challenge, so a later request through the same client can disclose a bearer token and request body to an attacker-controlled endpoint if the credential can obtain a token for that scope. The first request's validation error does not stop this later disclosure.

Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.

Read the original description

Affected versions of KeyVaultAuthorizer::on_challenge cache the authentication scope from a WWW-Authenticate response before verifying that the challenge resource matches the requested endpoint. When verification rejects the challenge, the scope remains cached. A subsequent request through the same client uses that scope to authorize the request without repeating challenge resource verification.

For azure_security_keyvault_certificates, the affected versions are 0.9.0 through 1.0.0, inclusive, and 1.1.0-beta.1. Versions before 0.9.0 do not use this challenge-scope cache and are unaffected by this issue.

Impact

An application that sends requests to an attacker-controlled endpoint and reuses the same client after a rejected challenge can disclose a bearer token and request body to that endpoint, if its credential can obtain a token for the supplied scope. The first request's validation error therefore does not prevent disclosure on a later request. Changing the request origin between requests is not required.

Fix

Update to 1.0.1 on the stable release line or 1.1.0-beta.2 on the preview release line.

The fix caches the scope only after challenge resource verification succeeds when verification is enabled. Rejected challenges no longer populate the cache. The existing option to disable challenge resource verification is unchanged; this fix does not add exact-origin binding.

cve.now Index

10Pcve.now Index 10 of 100 · methodology v3 · provisional
  • Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
  • Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
  • Reach10/20Affects crates.io packages
  • Severity?/10Unknown. No CVSS score or vendor rating
  • No patch0/5No signal

What would change the score

  • Would score about 65 if added to CISA KEV
  • Would score about 60 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
  • Would score about 32 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed

What to do

  • Upgrade to a fixed version: 1.0.1, 1.1.0-beta.2.

Timeline

  1. Advisory published73 days
  2. Record last updated

Affected versions

Evidence 5

  1. Advisory
  2. Repository
  3. Repository
  4. Repository
  5. Link

Corrections

None so far.

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Questions about RUSTSEC-2026-0437

Is RUSTSEC-2026-0437 being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data

Which versions are affected by RUSTSEC-2026-0437?

azure_security_keyvault_certificates (crates.io): from 0.9.0 before 1.0.1; from 1.1.0-beta.0 before 1.1.0-beta.2.Source: cve.now feed data

How do I fix RUSTSEC-2026-0437?

Upgrade to a fixed version: 1.0.1, 1.1.0-beta.2.Source: cve.now feed data