Arc has unauthenticated application log disclosure via `/api/v1/logs`
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98
- Who is exposed
- Not reported
Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98.
- Exploitation?/40Exploitation: unknown (data gap). No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure?/25Exposure: unknown (data gap). No advisory context yet
- Reach10/20Affects Go packages
- Severity1/10Rated low by ghsa
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 66 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 61 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 33 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed
GHSA-M3QR-FVP4-78XJ is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. No public exploit code is tracked. It is rated low by ghsa and affects github.com/basekick-labs/arc; fixed in 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- Published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 11/100 · provisional
- The rating the maker of the software gives it. Shown when it differs from the CVSS level.What do these mean? →
- Low (ghsa)
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Arc, a software project, has a flaw where its application log endpoint can be read without logging in, even though authentication is enabled by default. An unauthenticated remote user could retrieve recent internal application logs, which may expose sensitive operational details.
Read the original description
Arc exposes `GET /api/v1/logs` without authentication even when authentication is enabled by default. The route is registered before the global Fiber authentication middleware, and the handler returns recent buffered application logs without performing its own authorization check. Details Arc applies the global auth middleware after calling `server.RegisterRoutes()`: • `cmd/arc/main.go:1598-1599` registers base routes via `server.RegisterRoutes()`. • `cmd/arc/main.go:1601-1618` configures and installs `auth.NewMiddleware(...)` later. `server.RegisterRoutes()` registers `GET /api/v1/logs` as a base route: • `internal/api/server.go:164-183` registers base health, metrics, and logs routes, including `s.app.Get("/api/v1/logs", s.logsHandler)`. The logs handler returns buffered logs without checking authentication or authorization: • `internal/api/server.go:537-567` parses `limit`, `level`, and `since_minutes`, reads `logger.GetBuffer().GetRecent(...)`, and returns JSON. • `internal/logger/buffer.go:9-16` defines log entries returned to callers: timestamp, level, component, message, and caller. • `internal/logger/buffer.go:33-39` creates a global log buffer holding the last 10,000 entries. • `internal/api/server.go:540-558` permits up to `limit=1000` and `since_minutes=1440` in one unauthenticated request. Authentication is enabled by default and `/api/v1/logs` is not listed as a public route: • `internal/config/config.go:841-843` defaults auth to enabled. • `internal/auth/middleware.go:29-41` public defaults are `/health`, `/ready`, `/api/v1/auth/verify`, and `/metrics` prefix; `/api/v1/logs` is not public. However, Fiber route/middleware order makes the later middleware ineffective for an earlier exact route. Local verification against Fiber v2.52.13 showed a route registered before `app.Use(...)` returns `200` and the later middleware is not reached. Fiber’s router walks routes in declaration order and stops after the first matching route unless the handler calls `c.Next()`; `logsHandler` does not call `c.Next()`. Proof of concept Safe local reproduction only; do not scan external infrastructure. 1. Start Arc with default authentication enabled. 2. Request logs without an `Authorization` header or `x-api-key` header: ```bash curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/logs?limit=1000&since_minutes=1440' ``` Expected vulnerable result: ```http HTTP/1.1 200 OK Content-Type: application/json {"timestamp":"...","count":...,"logs":[...]} ``` 3. Compare with a protected endpoint without credentials: ```bash curl -i 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/api/v1/auth/tokens' ``` Expected protected result: ```http HTTP/1.1 401 Unauthorized ``` This demonstrates that default auth is active while `/api/v1/logs` bypasses it due to registration order. Impact An unauthenticated network attacker can retrieve recent application logs. Depending on deployment and log level, logs can disclose operational metadata such as component names, internal paths, database/measurement names, node identifiers, caller locations, request outcomes, and error details. This can assist further attacks and may expose sensitive data if any deployment logs secrets or user-controlled confidential data. The audit did not confirm that the bootstrap admin token banner is captured by this endpoint; that banner is printed with `fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, ...)`, while this endpoint reads the zerolog-backed application buffer. Workarounds Until patched, operators can restrict access to `/api/v1/logs` at a reverse proxy, firewall, ingress policy, or service mesh. If the endpoint is not needed, block it entirely. Suggested fix • Move `/api/v1/logs` registration after global auth middleware and require an authenticated administrator; or • Add explicit route-level middleware: `auth.RequireAdmin(authManager)` for `/api/v1/logs`; and • Add a regression test that unauthenticated requests to `/api/v1/logs` return 401/403 while `/health` and `/ready` remain public. References / evidence • `cmd/arc/main.go:1598-1618` • `internal/api/server.go:164-183` • `internal/api/server.go:537-567` • `internal/auth/middleware.go:29-41` • `internal/config/config.go:841-843` • `internal/logger/buffer.go:9-16` • `internal/logger/buffer.go:33-39`
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98.
Timeline
- Advisory published
- Record last updated
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- github.com/basekick-labs/arcGo
fixed in 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98
Evidence 5
- Advisory
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
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Questions about GHSA-M3QR-FVP4-78XJ
Is GHSA-M3QR-FVP4-78XJ being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
Which versions are affected by GHSA-M3QR-FVP4-78XJ?
github.com/basekick-labs/arc (Go): before 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98.Source: cve.now feed data
How do I fix GHSA-M3QR-FVP4-78XJ?
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.0-20260615165136-bb7d9761ad98.Source: cve.now feed data