Keycloak-services: keycloak-services: client manager can substitute sessionless token principal via hardcoded-claim mappers to obtain…
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- No fix listed
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. Attacker holds manage-clients permission on an OIDC client Attacker knows a realm administrator username or UUID Target uses sessionless client-credentials service-account tokens (no session ID)
- Last modified
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 30/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Keycloak, the open-source identity and access management software, is affected by a flaw where a user with limited client management permissions can alter identity claims in sessionless service-account tokens and be resolved as a more privileged user, such as a realm administrator, potentially gaining full control of the realm. The attack can be carried out remotely over the network, but it requires the attacker to have low-level login access and is considered difficult to execute.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
Read the original description
A flaw was found in the protocol mapper and identity resolution components of Keycloak. The issue occurs when a client manager uses hardcoded-claim mappers to override identity claims in sessionless service-account tokens. Because these tokens lack a session ID, Keycloak may incorrectly resolve the token bearer as a different, highly privileged user based on the manipulated claims. This can allow an attacker with limited client management permissions to impersonate a realm administrator and gain full control over the realm.
cve.now Index
- Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure8/25Specific setups only, reachable over the network
- Reach10/20Shipped in major Linux distributions
- Severity7.1/10CVSS 7.1
- No patch5/5No patch listed yet
What would change the score
- Would score about 80 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 75 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 37 if CISA's SSVC rates it automatable
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
Attacker holds manage-clients permission on an OIDC client Attacker knows a realm administrator username or UUID Target uses sessionless client-credentials service-account tokens (no session ID)Workaround: Until a fix is available, reduce who holds manage-clients permission on OIDC clients, since that permission is needed to add the hardcoded-claim mapper. Also review which realm administrator usernames and UUIDs are known outside administrative staff, because knowing one is part of the required setup.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- keycloak-services
Version range not reported
- rhbk/keycloak-rhel9
Version range not reported
- keycloak-services
Version range not reported
Evidence 2
- Report
- Link
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-97847
Is CVE-2026-97847 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
A user who can manage OIDC clients can add a hardcoded-claim mapper that sets the subject claim of a sessionless client-credentials service-account token to the name or UUID of a realm administrator. With that forged identity, the attacker can use the Admin REST API with the same powers as that administrator, including listing, creating and deleting users.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The facts name Red Hat Build of Keycloak and Red Hat Single Sign-On 7, with no version ranges given. The bug needs three things: the attacker holds manage-clients permission on an OIDC client, the attacker knows a realm administrator username or UUID, and the target uses sessionless client-credentials service-account tokens (tokens without a session ID, the default). To check a setup, look at the product version in the server's About or version information and at whether client-credentials service-account tokens are in use for the realm's clients.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com
How do I fix CVE-2026-97847?
No fixed release is listed in the checked facts, so no upgrade target can be given. Check Red Hat's advisory for CVE-2026-97847 for a fixed version and apply it when it is published.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com
What if there's no patch?
Until a fix is available, reduce who holds manage-clients permission on OIDC clients, since that permission is needed to add the hardcoded-claim mapper. Also review which realm administrator usernames and UUIDs are known outside administrative staff, because knowing one is part of the required setup.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com