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Zephyr PTP: unvalidated Delay_Resp message interval lets an on-link peer wedge the PTP thread and flood the network

6.5MediumCNA
Exploited
No known exploitation
Fix
Fixed in 4.3.2, 4.5.0
Who is exposed
Not reported

Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 4.3.2, 4.5.0.

Published
Last modified
Reference
Last checked
7/100 · provisional
None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub

Summary

The Zephyr PTP (IEEE 1588) implementation does not validate the logMessageInterval field of incoming Delay_Resp messages, so an attacker on the same network link can send one crafted message, with no login or user action, to halt time synchronization until reboot or to flood the local segment with multicast Delay_Req traffic. The impact is limited to availability, with no memory corruption or data disclosure.

Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.

Read the original description

The IEEE 1588 (PTP) port implementation in subsys/net/lib/ptp/port.c adopted the logMessageInterval field of a received Delay_Resp message without any validation. port_delay_resp_msg_process() stored the raw wire value (a full-range int8_t) into port_ds.log_min_delay_req_interval, and that value is later used as a shift count by port_timer_set_timeout() when the Delay_Req timer is armed. Values below about -30 truncate the computed timeout to zero, and values with a magnitude of 64 or more perform an undefined shift of a uint64_t; the standards-defined "not applicable" encoding 0x7F fell into the latter case as well.

PTP messages are received over unauthenticated link-local traffic (UDP multicast on 224.0.1.129, IPv6 multicast, or raw IEEE 802.3), and the handler accepts a Delay_Resp from any sender as long as the port is a time receiver using the end-to-end delay mechanism and the message echoes the port identity and a pending sequence id — both of which the victim itself broadcasts in its Delay_Req. Any node on the same link can therefore inject a single crafted Delay_Resp, or simply become the time transmitter and advertise the bogus interval.

Once the delay timer is armed with a zero timeout, the cooperative PTP thread re-arms and retransmits a Delay_Req on every tick. Each transmission takes a buffer from the fixed CONFIG_PTP_MSG_POLL_SIZE message slab (default 10) and holds it on port->delay_req_list for three seconds, so the slab is emptied within milliseconds and ptp_msg_alloc() then blocks with K_FOREVER inside the only thread that frees those buffers — permanently stalling time synchronization until reboot. Where a transmit-timestamp callback on another thread keeps recycling buffers, the result is instead a sustained multicast Delay_Req flood and continuous CPU consumption. There is no memory corruption and no disclosure of data; the impact is availability of the PTP subsystem and of the local network segment.

The fix rejects intervals outside a representable range and treats 0x7F as "not applicable" as required by IEEE 1588-2019 Table 42. The equivalent unchecked adoption of logMessageInterval from Sync messages in port_sync_msg_process(), a weaker variant of the same issue, is fixed by the companion change 334bf57f416f (#118150), which applies the same range check, ignores the field for unicast Sync messages and treats 0x7F as not applicable.

cve.now Index

7Pcve.now Index 7 of 100 · methodology v3 · provisional
  • Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
  • Exposure?/25Unknown. No advisory context yet
  • Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
  • Severity6.5/10CVSS 6.5
  • No patch0/5No signal

What would change the score

  • Would score about 62 if added to CISA KEV
  • Would score about 57 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
  • Would score about 29 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed

What to do

  • Upgrade to a fixed version: 4.3.2, 4.5.0.

Check your systems with an agent

Paste this into a coding or ops agent. It checks your systems read-only and reports a table per asset.

Check whether my systems are affected by CVE-2026-87042 (Zephyr PTP: unvalidated Delay_Resp message interval lets an on-link peer wedge the PTP thread and flood the network), using the cve.now data below.

Rules: work read-only. Do not run exploit code, proof-of-concept scripts or scanners that send attack payloads, and do not change any configuration, package, image or deployment. Report findings only.

What cve.now has for CVE-2026-87042 (entry last updated 2026-11-10):
Affected:
- zephyrproject zephyr: from 3.7.0, fixed in 4.3.2; from 4.4.0, fixed in 4.5.0
Fixed versions: 4.3.2, 4.5.0.
Setup: unknown whether the bug needs a non-default feature or setting. Check the advisory.
CISA KEV: CVE-2026-87042 is not listed as of cve.now's last read.
This KEV status is for CVE-2026-87042 only. If you also check another CVE, look up its own KEV status; never assume it from this one.

How to check:
- Installed software: check what is actually running, not what a repo declares. Read the version from each host, container image and Kubernetes node (the binary's version output, the OS package database, image layers), and check whether the conditions above hold there. Distribution packages may carry a backported fix under an older version number; confirm against the distribution's own advisory.

Verify against the linked advisories before concluding, and cite the date you read each one:
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/f6b9459f082ac8cc18b7d20a5c4ce1d86b7a55b5
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/commit/334bf57f416f2f65745e68db98edf3615ec4e7ab
- https://github.com/zephyrproject-rtos/zephyr/security/advisories/GHSA-cx9q-8hq3-7hpr
Do not conclude an asset is unaffected unless you checked it and the evidence covers both its version and the conditions above. If you could not check something, mark it unknown and say what is missing.

Report a table with one row per asset and these columns: Asset | Version or build | Status (affected, fixed, not applicable, unknown) | Compensating controls | Exposure (internet-facing, internal, none) | Evidence | Next action.

Entry: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-87042
For follow-up questions, use the cve.now MCP server at https://mcp.cve.now/mcp (no authentication), for example get_vulnerability with id CVE-2026-87042.

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now

Affected versions

  • zephyr

    From 3.7.0 · fixed in 4.3.2; From 4.4.0 · fixed in 4.5.0

Evidence 5

Vendor advisory · 1

Establishes: Affected and fixed versions.

  1. Advisory

CVE record · 2

Establishes: The identifier and description.

  1. Record
  2. Record

Other links · 2

  1. Patch
  2. Patch

Corrections

None so far.

Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.

Questions about CVE-2026-87042

Is CVE-2026-87042 being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data

Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-87042?

zephyr: from 3.7.0 before 4.3.2; from 4.4.0 before 4.5.0.Source: cve.now feed data

How do I fix CVE-2026-87042?

Upgrade to a fixed version: 4.3.2, 4.5.0.Source: cve.now feed data