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Tapo remote code execution in MCP server

Affects Tapo MCP server 0.3.1 through 0.4.0 when TAPO_MCP_API_KEY is unset and the Host-header allowlist is disabled. Fixed in 0.5.0.

CVE-2026-77329Published , updated

8.8HighCNA
Exploited
No known exploitation
Fix
Fixed in 0.5.0
Who is exposed
Specific setups only

Summary

The Tapo MCP server, when it runs without an API key, can be abused by a malicious website using DNS rebinding to send requests to a victim's local or LAN listener, without logging in and after the victim visits that site. An attacker can then control smart devices and take snapshots from configured cameras.

Written by a model

Original description

Tapo provides Rust and Python APIs and an MCP server for TP-Link Tapo smart devices. From 0.3.1 until 0.5.0, the Streamable HTTP implementation in tapo-mcp/src/server.rs calls disable_allowed_hosts() without replacement Host or Origin validation, while TAPO_MCP_API_KEY remains optional for a listener that can bind to all interfaces. A malicious website can use DNS rebinding to send same-origin browser requests to the victim's local or LAN Tapo MCP listener when it runs without an API key. The attacker can invoke exposed tools including control_device for smart-device actuation and take_snapshot for configured cameras. Deployments with TAPO_MCP_API_KEY set are not affected by the unauthenticated path, and exploitation requires a running listener configured with real Tapo credentials and devices, plus victim interaction with the malicious site. This issue is fixed in version 0.5.0.

Who should check

Teams running the Tapo MCP server (tapo, mihai-dinculescu) versions 0.3.1 to 0.4.0 without TAPO_MCP_API_KEY, including the Docker image, on a local or LAN listener.

“The Tapo MCP server disables the rmcp Streamable HTTP Host-header allowlist”

github.com

What to do

  1. Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.

    Tapo MCP server versions 0.3.1 through 0.4.0, where the Host-header allowlist was disabled TAPO_MCP_API_KEY is not set, so the server runs unauthenticated Listener bound to all interfaces, as in the Docker image Real Tapo credentials and devices configured Victim visits an attacker-controlled page capable of DNS rebinding
  2. Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.5.0.

Check your systems with an agent

Paste this into a coding or ops agent. It checks your systems read-only and reports a table per asset.

Check whether my systems are affected by CVE-2026-77329 (Tapo: DNS rebinding reaches unauthenticated Tapo MCP smart-home controls), using the cve.now data below.

Rules: work read-only. Do not run exploit code, proof-of-concept scripts or scanners that send attack payloads, and do not change any configuration, package, image or deployment. Report findings only.

What cve.now has for CVE-2026-77329 (entry last updated 2026-11-20):
Affected:
- mihai-dinculescu tapo: from 0.3.1, fixed in 0.5.0
Fixed versions: 0.5.0.
Conditions (all must be true for the bug to be hit):
- Tapo MCP server versions 0.3.1 through 0.4.0, where the Host-header allowlist was disabled (source: https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/releases/tag/tapo-mcp-v0.5.0)
- TAPO_MCP_API_KEY is not set, so the server runs unauthenticated (source: https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6)
- Listener bound to all interfaces, as in the Docker image (source: https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6)
- Real Tapo credentials and devices configured (source: https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6)
- Victim visits an attacker-controlled page capable of DNS rebinding (source: https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6)
Setup: unknown whether the bug needs a non-default feature or setting. Check the advisory.
Attacker needs: network access, no login, a user action.
CISA KEV: CVE-2026-77329 is not listed as of cve.now's last read.
This KEV status is for CVE-2026-77329 only. If you also check another CVE, look up its own KEV status; never assume it from this one.

How to check:
- Installed software: check what is actually running, not what a repo declares. Read the version from each host, container image and Kubernetes node (the binary's version output, the OS package database, image layers), and check whether the conditions above hold there. Distribution packages may carry a backported fix under an older version number; confirm against the distribution's own advisory.

Verify against the linked advisories before concluding, and cite the date you read each one:
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/security/advisories/GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/commit/cb9c5d4372bddfa11f19dc653a27c9aa4fa92833
- https://github.com/mihai-dinculescu/tapo/releases/tag/tapo-mcp-v0.5.0
Do not conclude an asset is unaffected unless you checked it and the evidence covers both its version and the conditions above. If you could not check something, mark it unknown and say what is missing.

Report a table with one row per asset and these columns: Asset | Version or build | Status (affected, fixed, not applicable, unknown) | Compensating controls | Exposure (internet-facing, internal, none) | Evidence | Next action.

Entry: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-77329
For follow-up questions, use the cve.now MCP server at https://mcp.cve.now/mcp (no authentication), for example execute with name cve.get and arguments {"id": "CVE-2026-77329"}.

Affected versions

cve.now Index

21Pof 100 · provisional · methodology v3
  • Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
  • Exposure12/25Specific setups only, reachable over the network without a login
  • Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
  • Severity8.8/10CVSS 8.8
  • No patch0/5No signal

What would change the score

  • Would score about 71 if added to CISA KEV
  • Would score about 66 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active

Timeline

  1. CVE published
  2. First seen by cve.now

Evidence 5

KindSource
Vendor advisory 1Establishes: Affected and fixed versions.
AdvisoryGitHub · mihai-dinculescu/tapo · Advisory GHSA-2cwc-6wwp-62q6
CVE record 2Establishes: The identifier and description.
RecordCVE List · CVE-2026-77329
RecordNVD · CVE-2026-77329
Other links 2
RepositoryGitHub · mihai-dinculescu/tapo · Commit cb9c5d43
RepositoryGitHub · mihai-dinculescu/tapo · Release tapo-mcp-v0.5.0

Questions about CVE-2026-77329

Is CVE-2026-77329 being exploited?

It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.

Source: cve.now feed data

What does this mean?

A DNS rebinding flaw lets a malicious web page reach the Tapo MCP server's local or LAN listener from a visitor's browser without authentication. Through it, devices can be listed, state changed with control_device, and camera snapshots captured with take_snapshot.

Source: github.com, github.com

Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-77329?

tapo: from 0.3.1 before 0.5.0.

Source: cve.now feed data

Am I affected, and how do I check?

Tapo MCP server versions 0.3.1 through 0.4.0 are affected where the Host-header allowlist was disabled, TAPO_MCP_API_KEY is not set, and the listener is bound to all interfaces as in the Docker image. Check the installed version and whether TAPO_MCP_API_KEY is set in the server's environment.

Source: github.com, github.com

How do I fix CVE-2026-77329?

Upgrade to Tapo MCP server 0.5.0, which restores the MCP Streamable HTTP DNS-rebinding protection that was disabled in 0.3.1.

Source: github.com, github.com

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