CVE
Heym: Missing role gate in team-member management lets any member add/remove members, exposing team-shared credentials
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.0.70
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. Attacker must already be a non-creator member of the team that has credentials team-shared into it. Credentials are shared into the team; team-share access is scoped only by team membership.
- Last modified
- Whether it needs action now or is a reference record, by fixed rules, with why. Last checked is when cve.now last re-read it.What do these mean? →
- Reference
- Last checked
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 16/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Heym, a self-hosted platform for building agentic systems and business-process automations, has a flaw in its team-member management that lets any non-creator team member add or remove members. An attacker with a low-privilege account can reach it remotely over the network and use it to add their own account to a team, then decrypt credentials shared into that team, such as provider API keys and OAuth tokens.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
Read the original description
Heym builds and runs agentic systems and business-process automations on self-hosted infrastructure. Prior to version 0.0.70, team-member management (add / remove / update) is gated only on team membership, not on the team creator/admin role — and TeamMember has no role column. Any non-creator member can seat an attacker account into the team; because credential team-shares are scoped only by TeamMember.user_id, the newly-added attacker can then decrypt every credential shared into that team (provider API keys, OAuth tokens. This issue has been patched in version 0.0.70.
Who should check
Teams running self-hosted Heym (heymrun/heym) where team members share provider API keys or OAuth tokens through team credential shares.
Read the source excerpt
“Team-member management ( add / remove / update ) is gated only on team membership”
cve.now Index
- Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure8/25Specific setups only, reachable over the network
- Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity8.1/10CVSS 8.1
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 66 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 61 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 23 if CISA's SSVC rates it automatable
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
Attacker must already be a non-creator member of the team that has credentials team-shared into it. Credentials are shared into the team; team-share access is scoped only by team membership.Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.70.
Check your systems with an agent
Paste this into a coding or ops agent. It checks your systems read-only and reports a table per asset.
Check whether my systems are affected by CVE-2026-67541 (Heym: Missing role gate in team-member management lets any member add/remove members, exposing team-shared credentials), using the cve.now data below.
Rules: work read-only. Do not run exploit code, proof-of-concept scripts or scanners that send attack payloads, and do not change any configuration, package, image or deployment. Report findings only.
What cve.now has for CVE-2026-67541 (entry last updated 2026-11-11):
Affected:
- heymrun heym: fixed in 0.0.70
Fixed versions: 0.0.70.
Conditions (all must be true for the bug to be hit):
- Attacker must already be a non-creator member of the team that has credentials team-shared into it. (source: https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpw-x7j7-8723)
- Credentials are shared into the team; team-share access is scoped only by team membership. (source: https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpw-x7j7-8723)
Setup: unknown whether the bug needs a non-default feature or setting. Check the advisory.
Attacker needs: network access, low-privilege login, no user action.
CISA KEV: CVE-2026-67541 is not listed as of cve.now's last read.
This KEV status is for CVE-2026-67541 only. If you also check another CVE, look up its own KEV status; never assume it from this one.
How to check:
- Installed software: check what is actually running, not what a repo declares. Read the version from each host, container image and Kubernetes node (the binary's version output, the OS package database, image layers), and check whether the conditions above hold there. Distribution packages may carry a backported fix under an older version number; confirm against the distribution's own advisory.
Verify against the linked advisories before concluding, and cite the date you read each one:
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/security/advisories/GHSA-vxpw-x7j7-8723
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/863e2702fca9a584246da9a51cca6b12828cebcf
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/a9fc3d864e87fa2449b235798189db9cd39367c4
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/commit/def26b5cf77dad4a9c5b5ff11c9863a0bc144ac8
- https://github.com/heymrun/heym/releases/tag/0.0.70
Do not conclude an asset is unaffected unless you checked it and the evidence covers both its version and the conditions above. If you could not check something, mark it unknown and say what is missing.
Report a table with one row per asset and these columns: Asset | Version or build | Status (affected, fixed, not applicable, unknown) | Compensating controls | Exposure (internet-facing, internal, none) | Evidence | Next action.
Entry: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-67541
For follow-up questions, use the cve.now MCP server at https://mcp.cve.now/mcp (no authentication), for example execute with name cve.get and arguments {"id": "CVE-2026-67541"}.Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- heymrun heym
fixed in 0.0.70
Evidence 7
Vendor advisory · 1
Establishes: Affected and fixed versions.
- Advisory
CVE record · 2
Establishes: The identifier and description.
- Record
- Record
Other links · 4
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-67541
Is CVE-2026-67541 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
Heym does not check the role of a team member before letting them manage the team roster. A regular, non-creator member can add or remove other members, and can use that to gain control of the team. That control exposes every credential shared into the team, including provider keys and OAuth tokens.Source: github.com
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-67541?
heym: before 0.0.70.Source: cve.now feed data
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The fixed range lists Heym versions before 0.0.70 as affected. The setup at risk is a team that has credentials shared into it and has non-creator members. To check a Heym install, compare its version with the fixed range in the advisory, and check whether any team has shared credentials.Source: github.com
How do I fix CVE-2026-67541?
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.0.70.Source: cve.now feed data