OpenEMR FaxSMS module: insecure staging of decrypted patient documents in webroot
OpenEMR versions before 8.2.0 with the FaxSMS module are affected when outbound faxes go through the SignalWire provider, which stages decrypted patient documents in a web-accessible directory. Fixed in 8.2.0.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- Fixed in 8.2.0
- Who is exposed
- Default setups
Do first: Check every install: default setups are affected.
- Last modified
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 30/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Default setups
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Patient documents in the OpenEMR FaxSMS module are saved as unprotected files under a web-accessible folder, so anyone who guesses or obtains the file's link can read them. An attacker can do this remotely, without logging in, and the files stay on the server even when drive encryption is enabled.
Read the original description
OpenEMR is a free and open source electronic health records and medical practice management application. Prior to 8.2.0, interface/modules/custom_modules/oe-module-faxsms/src/Controller/SignalWireClient.php decrypts a selected patient document with Document::get_data() and SignalWireClient::uploadFileForFax() writes the plaintext bytes under sites/{siteId}/fax. The module returns the resulting public URL to SignalWire, protects it only with a predictable uniqid() filename, and never removes the staged file. An unauthenticated network actor who obtains or guesses the URL can retrieve persistent patient documents even when drive encryption is enabled. This issue is fixed in version 8.2.0.
cve.now Index
- Exploitation?/40Unknown. No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure22/25Default setups, reachable over the network without a login
- Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity7.5/10CVSS 7.5
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 70 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 65 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
What to do
Check every install: default setups are affected.
Upgrade to a fixed version: 8.2.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- openemr openemr
fixed in 8.2.0
Evidence 4
- Advisory
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-65983
Is CVE-2026-65983 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
When a user sends an outbound fax through the SignalWire provider, the FaxSMS module stages the decrypted patient document in a fax directory that Apache serves directly, without any OpenEMR session or login. The staged files remain on disk indefinitely, so anyone who obtains or guesses the URL can download them.Source: github.com
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-65983?
openemr: before 8.2.0.Source: cve.now feed data
Am I affected, and how do I check?
OpenEMR versions before 8.2.0 that use the FaxSMS module with the SignalWire provider. To check, compare the installed OpenEMR version against 8.2.0 and confirm whether FaxSMS is enabled with SignalWire for outbound faxes.Source: github.com
How do I fix CVE-2026-65983?
Upgrade OpenEMR to 8.2.0 or later, which contains the fix.Source: github.com