Yeti: Path traversal in ExportTask name allows authenticated arbitrary file read and write
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- No fix listed
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. Default local export storage backend is used Attacker has a valid authenticated account (non-admin is sufficient) YETI service account has filesystem read/write permissions on the targeted paths
- Exploitation?/40Exploitation: unknown (data gap). No CISA SSVC exploitation rating yet
- Exposure8/25Specific setups only, reachable over the network
- Reach?/20Reach: unknown (data gap). No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity8.3/10CVSS 8.3
- No patch5/5No patch listed yet
What would change the score
- Would score about 71 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 66 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 28 if CISA's SSVC rates it automatable
CVE-2026-63502 is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. No public exploit code is tracked. It is rated CVSS 8.3 (high) and affects yeti; no fixed version is listed yet.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- Published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 21/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Yeti, a Forensics Intelligence platform used by CTI and DFIR practitioners, is affected by a path traversal flaw in its export task feature. An authenticated user with low privileges can exploit the default local storage backend to read files the Yeti service account can access, and can potentially write export output to arbitrary writable locations.
Read the original description
Yeti bridges the gap between CTI and DFIR practitioners by providing a Forensics Intelligence platform and pipeline. Prior to 2.5.1, YETI derives ExportTask.file_name from the user-controlled task name and passes it to core/clients/file_storage/classes/local_storage.py without sanitizing traversal sequences or enforcing path confinement. A low-privileged authenticated user using the default local storage backend can call POST /api/v2/tasks/export/new with a traversal name and use ExportTask.file_contents through GET /api/v2/tasks/export/{export_id}/content to read files accessible to the YETI service account. Running ExportTask.run() can also write attacker-controlled export output to an attacker-selected writable path. The impact depends on the service account's filesystem permissions, and universal code execution is not established. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.1.
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
Default local export storage backend is used Attacker has a valid authenticated account (non-admin is sufficient) YETI service account has filesystem read/write permissions on the targeted pathsWorkaround: The checked facts do not list a workaround. Restricting the YETI service account's filesystem read/write permissions to only the paths it needs would remove one of the conditions the bug depends on.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- yeti-platform yeti
through 2.5.0
Evidence 4
- Advisory
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-63502
Is CVE-2026-63502 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
The ExportTask name field does not restrict file paths, so an authenticated user can read and write files outside the intended export location. The reach of this is limited to paths the YETI service account can access.Source: github.com
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-63502?
yeti: through 2.5.0.Source: cve.now feed data
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions up to and including 2.5.0 of the yeti-platform yeti product are listed as affected. The bug depends on the default local export storage backend being in use and on the service account having filesystem read/write permissions on the targeted paths. To check, look at the configured export storage backend and the filesystem permissions of the YETI service account.Source: github.com
How do I fix CVE-2026-63502?
The checked facts do not name a fixed version. Because the affected range ends at 2.5.0, the fix must be a release later than 2.5.0, so check the vendor's release notes for the first fixed version.Source: github.com
What if there's no patch?
The checked facts do not list a workaround. Restricting the YETI service account's filesystem read/write permissions to only the paths it needs would remove one of the conditions the bug depends on.Source: github.com