TAKO AI Agent for Okta: Unauthenticated first-run administrator takeover
Affects TAKO AI Agent for Okta v3.0.0-beta on fresh deployments where initial setup has not yet been completed. Fixed in v3.0.1-beta.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Default setups
- Fix
- Fixed in 3.0.1-beta
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The TAKO AI Agent for Okta application, a local-first tool that lets Okta administrators query tenant data in natural language, is affected. An unauthenticated network attacker can create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner finishes setup, gaining full control to read synced Okta user data, API tokens, chat history, and configuration, change Okta credentials, and lock out real administrators.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
TAKO AI Agent for Okta is a local-first AI agent that helps Okta administrators query tenant data using natural language. Prior to 3.0.1-beta, `POST /api/auth/setup` in `src/api/routers/auth.py` allows an unauthenticated network attacker to create the first administrator account before the legitimate owner completes initial setup. The `initial_setup` function checks only the `is_setup` completion flag and requires no authentication, one-time bootstrap token, or network restriction. The default `docker-compose.yml` publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, the `Dockerfile` starts the listener on 0.0.0.0, and `src/api/main.py` mounts the authentication router without a global authentication guard. The endpoint invokes `create_auth_user` with `UserRole.ADMIN` and `set_auth_cookie`, issuing a valid `fctr_session` JWT cookie. Localhost-only CORS rules do not restrict non-browser HTTP clients, and the setup operation does not require access to a real Okta tenant. The attacker becomes the sole administrator and prevents legitimate first-run setup, can read Okta-synced user data, API tokens, chat history, and application configuration, modify users and Okta integration credentials, and lock out administrators or disable the service. Already completed setup is rejected. This issue is fixed in version 3.0.1-beta.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Posted on X by cve.now
Affected versions
- fctr-id okta-ai-agent
fixed in 3.0.1-beta
References 3
GitHub · fctr-id/okta-ai-agent
Questions about CVE-2026-63377
What does this mean?
Before the legitimate owner completes initial setup, an unauthenticated network attacker who sends a single HTTP request to a freshly deployed instance gains permanent administrative control of the application.Source: github.com, github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Affected version is v3.0.0-beta, and the exposure applies while initial setup has not been completed on the instance. The default Docker configuration publishes port 8001 on all interfaces, so an instance reachable from untrusted hosts fits this case. To check, confirm the installed version is v3.0.0-beta and whether initial setup has been finished.Source: github.com, github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade to v3.0.1-beta, the fixed version.Source: github.com, github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data