MyTube: Visitor Can Access Hidden Video Metadata and Content
Affects MyTube in multi-user mode with loginEnabled=true and a visitor password set. Fixed in 1.10.3.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.10.3
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
MyTube, a self-hosted video downloader and player, is affected when login and a visitor password are enabled, allowing a low-privilege visitor to see hidden videos' titles, source URLs, file paths, and media files that should be restricted to the owner. Default single-user deployments without login are not affected.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
MyTube is a self-hosted downloader and player for several video websites. Prior to version 1.10.3, backend video access does not enforce the visitor role's intended public-only restriction when `loginEnabled=true` and a visitor password is configured. The frontend filter in `VideoContext.tsx` is only client-side, `roleBasedAuthMiddleware.ts` allows all visitor GET requests, and `storageService/videos.ts` performs `getVideos()` and `getVideoById(id)` queries without checking the caller's role or `visibility`. A visitor can enumerate `/api/videos` or request `/api/videos/:id` to retrieve hidden `visibility`=0 records, exposing titles, `sourceUrl` values, `videoPath` values, subtitle paths and `thumbnailPath` values. The `serveMountVideo()` path also serves mounted video files without `visibility` checks. Leaked paths work against unauthenticated `/videos/*` and `/subtitles/*` routes, allowing media downloads without credentials. The RSS visitor feed already filters `visibility`=1 content and is not the affected query path. Default loginEnabled=false single-user deployments are unaffected by this role-boundary issue because all callers are owner-equivalent. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.3.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- franklioxygen MyTube
fixed in 1.10.3
References 6
GitHub · franklioxygen/MyTube
Questions about CVE-2026-62301
What does this mean?
A visitor can list hidden videos and read their titles, source URLs, and video, subtitle, and thumbnail file paths. The visitor can then download the media files without credentials through unauthenticated static routes.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The affected range is MyTube versions before 1.10.3, in multi-user mode with loginEnabled=true and a visitor password set. Check the installed version and whether loginEnabled is true with a visitor password configured.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
The affected range lists 1.10.3 as the fixed version, so the upgrade target is 1.10.3 or later. The fix field in the record is empty, so confirm the release notes before relying on it.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
Why do the sources disagree?
The description says the issue is reachable without authentication. The CVSS vector lists PR:L, which means low privileges are required. The two sources do not match on whether any privileges are needed.Source: github.com