Filecoin Pin: Unbounded DAG pinning can exhaust filecoin-pin server resources
Only Filecoin Pin 1.1.0 and earlier are affected, and unauthenticated access requires the server to run with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true. The fix is in 1.1.1.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.1.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Filecoin Pin, an IPFS Pinning Service API server that pins content to Filecoin's PDP service, is affected in daemon deployments up to and including 1.1.1. An authenticated caller, or any caller when anonymous access is enabled, can submit large or deeply nested content that consumes disk, network, CPU, memory, and libp2p resources without limits, which can degrade the service or crash the host or process and leave partial CAR files that need recovery.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. In daemon deployments up to and including version 1.1.0, `POST /pins` in `src/filecoin-pinning-server.ts` checks a caller-supplied CID with `CID.parse` and passes it to `pinStore.pin`, but does not enforce request rate limits or per-user quotas. In `src/filecoin-pin-store.ts`, each pin independently schedules `_processPinInBackground` with `setTimeout` without a queue, semaphore or concurrency cap, then recursively traverses the full DAG using `helia.pins.add(cid)`. The per-pin Helia/Bitswap node in `src/create-pinning-helia.ts` has no application-level byte, block or traversal-time limits. Blocks are written under `carStoragePath` by `src/core/car/car-blockstore-base.ts` and `src/core/car/car-file-backend.ts`, with `stats.totalSize` updated only after writing. An authenticated caller, or an anonymous caller when `ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true`, can submit large DAGs and exhaust disk, network, CPU, memory and libp2p resources, causing service degradation or host/process failure and leaving partial CAR files requiring recovery. The default localhost binding and token requirement reduce exposure. Because nodes have no bootstrap or mDNS configuration, a CID alone may not be fetchable, but caller-supplied `origins` can point to a reachable attacker-controlled libp2p source; concurrent requests accelerate resource pressure. Version 1.1.1 documents operational mitigations but does not implement the missing resource controls.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- filecoin-project filecoin-pin
through 1.1.0
References 2
GitHub · filecoin-project/filecoin-pin
Questions about CVE-2026-62300
What does this mean?
Filecoin Pin does not limit how much DAG content a pin request can take. Unauthenticated requests can use up disk, network, CPU and libp2p resources until the process or host becomes unavailable, and can leave large partial CAR files behind.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions 1.1.0 and earlier (<=1.1.0) are affected. Unauthenticated access is possible only when the server runs with ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, so check the installed Filecoin Pin version and whether that setting is enabled on the server.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade to Filecoin Pin 1.1.1, the patched version. Until you can upgrade, do not enable ALLOW_NO_AUTH=true, bind the server to localhost, treat the access token as a single-tenant secret, and run it on a host with bounded storage.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data