OSAC operator: Kubeconfig credential-plugin execution and SSRF in console proxy
Affects osac-operator in remote or auto VM cluster mode, the default; local-only mode is not affected. Fixed in commit 7e4222b.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 7e4222b
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
The OSAC Kubernetes operator's console proxy, in its remote and auto VM cluster modes, is affected. An attacker who can create or modify certain Secrets in a namespace the proxy can read could make the proxy run an arbitrary process under its service account and send server-side requests from the proxy pod.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
OSAC operator is a Kubernetes operator. In the affected revision identified as 8220502, the `console-proxy` `RemoteConfigResolver` parses Kubernetes Secret kubeconfig data with `clientcmd.RESTConfigFromKubeConfig` without sanitizing the resulting `rest.Config`. An attacker who can create or modify a Secret labeled `osac.openshift.io/remote-cluster-kubeconfig`: "true" in a namespace where the proxy's RoleBinding grants Secret read access can supply `users[].user.exec`. When `rest.TransportFor` builds the HTTP transport for an upstream WebSocket connection, client-go invokes that exec credential plugin, spawning an arbitrary process as the osac-`console-proxy` service account inside the pod. Attacker-controlled `clusters[].server` also enables server-side request forgery from the proxy pod. Remote and auto VM cluster modes are affected, with auto the default; exclusively `local` mode does not read kubeconfig Secrets and is unaffected. The credential-plugin execution path is patched in commit 7e4222b; that patch does not address the described server-address SSRF path.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- osac-project osac-operator
fixed in 7e4222b
References 4
GitHub · osac-project/osac-operator
Questions about CVE-2026-62284
What does this mean?
A flaw in how the operator handles kubeconfig credential plugins lets code run inside the console-proxy pod as its osac-console-proxy service account. It also lets the proxy send server-side requests to cluster server addresses an attacker chooses (server-side request forgery).Source: github.com, github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Deployments using remote or auto VM cluster mode, which is the default, are in scope; local-only mode is not affected. The exposure also depends on Secret read access in a namespace where the console-proxy has it, as governed by its RoleBinding. To check, look at the VM cluster mode setting and confirm whether the operator build includes commit 7e4222b.Source: github.com, github.com
What should I do about it?
Update the osac-operator to a build that includes commit 7e4222b. Until then, restrict Secret creation in the namespace where the console-proxy RoleBinding is deployed to trusted principals.Source: github.com, github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data