Bazarr: Plex OAuth API namespace is entirely unauthenticated, allowing config tampering, integration takeover and server-side request…
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Unclear
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.5.7-beta.14
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Bazarr, a companion application for Sonarr and Radarr, is affected through its Plex OAuth API, which allowed unauthenticated users to change settings and link Plex accounts. An attacker could use this to disable the Plex integration, alter its configuration, or send server-side requests that expose the stored API key.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Bazarr is a companion application to Sonarr and Radarr. Prior to 1.5.7-beta.14, the `api_ns_plex` namespace in `bazarr/api/plex/oauth.py` omits `@authenticate` on its Resource handlers, while normal APIs require an API key and no global authentication hook compensates. Anonymous callers can invoke `POST /api/plex/oauth/logout` to clear credentials and disable the integration, or `POST /api/plex/apikey` to persist an attacker-selected key, without a PIN, account or state precondition. `POST /api/plex/oauth/pin` and `GET /api/plex/oauth/pin/<pin_id>/check` additionally allow an attacker who completes a PIN with an attacker-controlled Plex account to bind that account's token to the instance. `PlexPinCheck` skips state validation when `state_param` is absent and merely logs a mismatch without stopping execution. `POST /api/plex/select-server`, `POST /api/plex/oauth/servers`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/create`, `POST /api/plex/webhook/delete` and `POST /api/plex/encrypt-apikey` expose further `write_config()` operations. Attacker-controlled server URLs feed later outbound requests carrying the configured API key in `X-Plex-Token`, enabling server-side request forgery and credential exposure in addition to persistent configuration tampering and integration denial of service. Version 1.5.7-beta.14 closes the anonymous API-mutation path by adding authentication; complete OAuth state validation is not established and remains a separate residual for curator review.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Posted on X by cve.now
Affected versions
- morpheus65535 bazarr
fixed in 1.5.7-beta.14
References 4
GitHub · morpheus65535/bazarr
Questions about CVE-2026-61826
What does this mean?
An unauthenticated remote attacker can clear the Plex credentials and disable the Plex integration, set the API key persistently, and bind the attacker's own Plex token to the instance. The bug also allows server-side request forgery that exposes the configured API key in an X-Plex-Token header.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The flaw is in the Plex OAuth API namespace of Bazarr, which has no authentication. Versions before 1.5.7-beta.14 are in the affected range, so compare the installed Bazarr version with 1.5.7-beta.14.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade Bazarr to 1.5.7-beta.14 or a later version. No workaround is listed in the checked facts.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data