SOCFortress CoPilot: Cross-Tenant Arbitrary Object-Store Write via the Data-Store Upload Endpoint (customer_user)
Affects SOCFortress CoPilot before 0.1.76 for portal users holding the customer_user role. The fix is in 0.1.76.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.76
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
SOCFortress CoPilot focuses on providing a single pane of glass for all your security operations needs. Prior to 0.1.76, `POST /api/agent_data_store/upload` in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_routes.py` permits `customer_user` callers to choose `bucket_name` and `object_name` without an allowlist, tenant prefix, ownership check or content restriction. The only file check requires a nonempty filename. The operations in `backend/app/data_store/data_store_operations.py` create missing buckets and upsert objects, allowing existing objects belonging to any tenant to be overwritten. Targets include `sysmon-configs/<customer_code>/sysmon_config.xml` distributed to managed Windows endpoints, `copilot-case-report-templates/<name>` rendered server-side, and case evidence or forensic artifacts under `copilot-cases/<case_id>/<file>` and `velociraptor-artifacts/<agent_id>/<flow_id>/<file>`. A lowest-privilege user can tamper with cross-tenant evidence, blind endpoint telemetry, poison report templates for later code execution, plant data or exhaust storage. Sibling list, download and delete routes remain restricted to admin/analyst; the exposed operation is the upload write path. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.76.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- socfortress CoPilot
fixed in 0.1.76
References 4
GitHub · socfortress/CoPilot
Questions about CVE-2026-61708
What does this mean?
The data-store upload endpoint lets a customer_user choose the destination bucket and object key, with no ownership check. That allows overwriting objects in any tenant's buckets, including case evidence, forensic artifacts, sysmon configurations, and report templates. It can also create buckets and use up storage.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
CoPilot versions before 0.1.76 are in the affected range. The exposure needs a portal account with the customer_user role that can reach the data-store upload endpoint. Check the installed CoPilot version against 0.1.76 and review which roles can use that endpoint.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade CoPilot to 0.1.76 or later.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data