Copernik XML Factory: Improper restriction of XInclude resource resolution in Copernik XML Factory (stock JDK provider)
Affects Copernik XML Factory before 0.1.2 when the stock JDK provider is used (no Apache Xerces on the classpath) with XInclude enabled on untrusted XML. Fixed in 0.1.2.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.2
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Copernik XML Factory, a Java library for creating secure JAXP XML parsers, is affected when it uses the stock JDK XML provider (without Apache Xerces on the classpath) and an application enables XInclude processing. An attacker who supplies untrusted XML could use crafted xi:include references to read local files or make server-side requests to internal network endpoints.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Copernik XML Factory provides secure-by-default JAXP factory creation for Java. Prior to 0.1.2, Copernik XML Factory does not block XInclude resource resolution on the stock JDK provider after an application enables XInclude on a factory returned by `XmlFactories.newDocumentBuilderFactory()` or `XmlFactories.newSAXParserFactory()`, or on an `XMLReader` passed through `XmlFactories.harden()`. An application parsing untrusted XML can resolve attacker-controlled `xi:include` references to disclose local files or, through `http` references, reach internal network endpoints by server-side request forgery. Exploitation requires use of one of those factory/hardening APIs, the stock JDK provider with Apache Xerces absent from the classpath, explicit `setXIncludeAware(true)` or the equivalent reader feature, and XML from an untrusted source. The Xerces provider selected when Xerces is present and the Android provider are unaffected. This issue is fixed in version 0.1.2.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- copernik-eu copernik-xml-factory
fixed in 0.1.2
References 4
GitHub · copernik-eu/copernik-xml-factory
Questions about CVE-2026-61586
What does this mean?
The library does not restrict how XInclude references are resolved. Crafted XML can therefore make the parser read local files or send requests to internal network endpoints.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions before 0.1.2 are affected, in applications that get a factory from XmlFactories.newDocumentBuilderFactory() or XmlFactories.newSAXParserFactory(), or harden an external XMLReader with XmlFactories.harden(), and that enable XInclude with setXIncludeAware(true) or the equivalent reader feature. To check, look for xercesImpl in the dependency tree (its absence means the stock JDK provider is in use) and search the code for setXIncludeAware(true).Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade Copernik XML Factory to 0.1.2 or later, which fixes the defect.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data