In multiple functions of base.c, there is a possible use-after-free due to a race condition.
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- No fix listed
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. A concurrent exec() can free the task's dmabuf_info while the per-process dmabuf accounting procfs files are reading it
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- Published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 19/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: total
Summary
In multiple functions of base.c, there is a possible use-after-free due to a race condition. This could lead to local escalation of privilege with no additional execution privileges needed. User interaction is not needed for exploitation.
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
A concurrent exec() can free the task's dmabuf_info while the per-process dmabuf accounting procfs files are reading itWorkaround: The checked facts give no workaround. The condition requires an exec() running at the same time as reads of the dmabuf accounting procfs files, so that race is the only trigger the facts describe.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: total
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Google Android
Version range not reported
Evidence 5
- Link
- Link
- Link
- Link
- Link
Corrections
None so far.
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Questions about CVE-2026-58828
What does this mean?
A race condition in base.c lets a concurrent exec() free a task's dmabuf_info struct while the per-process dmabuf accounting procfs files are still reading it. The reader then uses memory that has already been freed (a use-after-free).Source: android.googlesource.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The checked facts name Android but give no version ranges or device setups. To check a device, look at its Android security patch level (Settings > About phone, or the ro.build.version.security_patch property) and compare it with the Android security bulletin that covers this CVE.Source: android.googlesource.com
What should I do about it?
The checked facts list no fix, so no patched version can be named. Check the Android security bulletin for the patch level that includes the fix for CVE-2026-58828.Source: android.googlesource.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What if there's no patch?
The checked facts give no workaround. The condition requires an exec() running at the same time as reads of the dmabuf accounting procfs files, so that race is the only trigger the facts describe.Source: android.googlesource.com