Filecoin Pin: Fork bypass in the privileged GitHub Actions workflow
Affects the Filecoin Pin upload action 1.0.1 and earlier in the documented two-workflow pattern, where a privileged workflow_run workflow uploads artifacts from a fork pull request. Fixed in 1.1.0.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.1.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The Filecoin Pin GitHub Action, which uploads build artifacts to Filecoin's PDP storage using a repository owner's wallet, is affected. An outside contributor submitting a fork pull request can trigger uploads of their own files through the privileged workflow, causing unauthorized spending of the owner's wallet funds and polluting the stored dataset.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Filecoin Pin is an IPFS Pinning Service API implementation that pins to Filecoin's PDP service. Prior to 1.1.0, the upload GitHub Action's fork detection in `upload-action/src/build.js` checks only `event.pull_request`. In the documented two-workflow pattern, an untrusted fork pull-request workflow produces an artifact and a privileged `workflow_run` workflow downloads and uploads it. Because `workflow_run` has no `event.pull_request`, `isForkPR` becomes false and `uploadStatus` becomes `pending-upload`. The action later resolves `workflow_run.pull_requests` without repeating the fork check before initializing the wallet with `walletPrivateKey` and uploading the artifact. An external contributor can therefore cause attacker-controlled artifacts to be stored using the repository owner's Filecoin wallet, incurring unauthorized storage expenditure, dataset pollution and consumption of configured wallet funds. Disclosure of the wallet private key is not required. The 0.x action line is not receiving a backport and must be migrated to a fixed 1.x release. This issue is fixed in version 1.1.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- filecoin-project filecoin-pin
fixed in 1.1.0
References 4
GitHub · filecoin-project/filecoin-pin
Questions about CVE-2026-58412
What does this mean?
A fork pull request can cause arbitrary artifacts it produces to be uploaded using the repository owner's Filecoin wallet. The result is unauthorised storage expenditure, dataset pollution, and consumption of configured wallet funds.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Upload action versions 1.0.1 and earlier are affected, in the documented setup where an untrusted pull request workflow creates an artifact and a privileged workflow_run workflow downloads and uploads it. To check a setup, look at the upload action version pinned in the privileged workflow and whether that workflow is triggered by workflow_run.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade the upload action to 1.1.0 or later.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data