PinePods: Authenticated SSRF via podcast RSS enclosure URL (server-side fetch of attacker-controlled URL, no host validation)
Affects PinePods versions before 0.9.0 when server downloads are enabled, which is the default. Only authenticated low-privilege users can trigger it. Fixed in 0.9.0.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.9.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
PinePods, a self-hosted podcast management system written in Rust, is affected by a server-side request forgery flaw in its podcast feed handling. An authenticated user can make the server fetch internal or cloud metadata endpoints and expose the responses, which may reveal internal services, confidential data, or cloud credentials.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
PinePods is a complete, self-hosted podcast management system written in Rust. Prior to 0.9.0, an authenticated user can subscribe to an attacker-controlled RSS feed through `POST /api/data/add_podcast` in `rust-api/src/handlers/podcasts.rs`. `get_podcast_values` and `add_episodes` in `rust-api/src/database.rs` parse the feed with `feed-rs` and store the `<enclosure url>` verbatim in `Episodes.episodeurl` without destination host/IP validation. `POST /api/data/download_podcast` invokes `spawn_download_podcast_episode` and `download_episode_and_wait()` in `rust-api/src/services/tasks.rs`, which sends a `reqwest` GET to the stored URL and saves and records the response in `DownloadedEpisodes` for later retrieval. The `estimate_duration_from_audio_url_async()` path in `rust-api/src/database.rs` also sends an unvalidated HEAD during feed add/refresh. Default redirect following permits an initially external enclosure URL to redirect to an internal target. A low-privilege user can make server-side GET/HEAD requests to reachable loopback, private-network and cloud metadata services and read downloaded internal responses, enabling internal-service enumeration, confidential-data disclosure and possible metadata credential theft. Episode downloading requires server downloads to be enabled, which is the default; self-service signup is supported. This issue is fixed in version 0.9.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
- Posted on X by cve.now
Affected versions
- madeofpendletonwool PinePods
fixed in 0.9.0
References 3
GitHub · madeofpendletonwool/PinePods
Questions about CVE-2026-55598
What does this mean?
A logged-in low-privilege user can make the PinePods server send GET or HEAD requests to any host they choose, including hosts on the server's internal network and cloud metadata endpoints, and read the responses back. The server does not check the destination host of the podcast episode URL it fetches.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
PinePods versions before 0.9.0 are affected, and the bug applies when server downloads are enabled, which is the default setting. To check, look at the PinePods version shown in the app or deployment and review the server downloads setting.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade PinePods to version 0.9.0 or later, which contains the fix.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. CISA's SSVC assessment notes a proof of concept exists. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data