CVE
a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx credential leak via redirect in Vert.x HTTP client
Only affects a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final when PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is enabled. Fixed in 1.5.0.Final.
Written by a model from the sources below. Verify against them.
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N
- Exploited
- Proof of concept public, per CISA
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.5.0.Final
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. The client must have PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) enabled, which is an opt-in and off by default. Affects the Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx). Affected versions are 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final.
- Last modified
- Whether it needs action now or is a reference record, by fixed rules, with why. Last checked is when cve.now last re-read it.What do these mean? →
- Reference
- Last checked
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 38/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx HTTP client, when redirect following is turned on, copies all request headers onto a redirect that points to a different host and does not strip them. A remote attacker who controls an agent can send such a redirect without logging in, and the client will forward the Authorization credentials and API-key headers to the attacker's host.
Original description
The Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx) hand-rolls a POST redirect follower that, when the documented PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) opt-in is enabled, re-issues the redirected request with the full request header map copied verbatim and performs no credential stripping and no same-authority check. A malicious, compromised, or mistyped agent that returns a 30x response with an absolute cross-host Location causes the client to forward the standard Authorization header (Bearer/Basic/OAuth) — plus every other header, including the allowlisted API-key headers — to the attacker-controlled authority. This breaks the project's own cross-transport invariant (SECURITY.md §8, OkHttpPostRedirectHeaderLeakTest) that credentials are stripped on cross-authority redirects even when redirects are followed. The sibling JDK and OkHttp/Android transports strip Authorization; Vert.x uniquely does not. This is a "fix introduced the bug" variant — the follower was added by the GHSA-9rhm hardening PR (3ae82912, refined by a5e76a0b).
Who should check
Java teams using the a2a-java Vert.x HTTP client 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final with PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) enabled.
“first released in v1.3.2.Final, and refined by a5e76a0b in v1.4.0.Final”
cve.now Index
- Exploitation15/40CISA rates a proof of concept as public
- Exposure15/25Specific setups only, CISA rates it automatable
- Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity7.5/10CVSS 7.5
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 73 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 68 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
The client must have PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) enabled, which is an opt-in and off by default. Affects the Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx). Affected versions are 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final.Upgrade to a fixed version: 1.5.0.Final.
Workaround: Leave PostBuilder.followRedirects(false), the default, so the SDK does not re-issue POST requests to redirect targets.
Check your systems with an agent
Paste this into a coding or ops agent. It checks your systems read-only and reports a table per asset.
Check whether my systems are affected by CVE-2026-130627 (Vert.x HTTP client forwards Authorization and all headers to cross-authority redirect target when followRedirects(true)), using the cve.now data below.
Rules: work read-only. Do not run exploit code, proof-of-concept scripts or scanners that send attack payloads, and do not change any configuration, package, image or deployment. Report findings only.
What cve.now has for CVE-2026-130627 (entry last updated 2026-11-17):
Affected:
- a2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx: from 1.3.2.Final, through 1.4.0.Final
Fixed versions: 1.5.0.Final.
Conditions (all must be true for the bug to be hit):
- The client must have PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) enabled, which is an opt-in and off by default. (source: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr)
- Affects the Vert.x HTTP client transport (a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx). (source: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr)
- Affected versions are 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final. (source: https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr)
Setup: the bug needs a feature or setting that is off by default or uncommon. Check whether each asset has it on.
Attacker needs: network access, no login, no user action.
Workaround: Leave PostBuilder.followRedirects(false), the default, so the SDK does not re-issue POST requests to redirect targets. (source: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130627)
CISA KEV: CVE-2026-130627 is not listed as of cve.now's last read.
This KEV status is for CVE-2026-130627 only. If you also check another CVE, look up its own KEV status; never assume it from this one.
How to check:
- Installed software: check what is actually running, not what a repo declares. Read the version from each host, container image and Kubernetes node (the binary's version output, the OS package database, image layers), and check whether the conditions above hold there. Distribution packages may carry a backported fix under an older version number; confirm against the distribution's own advisory.
Verify against the linked advisories before concluding, and cite the date you read each one:
- https://github.com/a2aproject/a2a-java/security/advisories/GHSA-w377-w7c6-c8hr
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-130627
Do not conclude an asset is unaffected unless you checked it and the evidence covers both its version and the conditions above. If you could not check something, mark it unknown and say what is missing.
Report a table with one row per asset and these columns: Asset | Version or build | Status (affected, fixed, not applicable, unknown) | Compensating controls | Exposure (internet-facing, internal, none) | Evidence | Next action.
Entry: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-130627
For follow-up questions, use the cve.now MCP server at https://mcp.cve.now/mcp (no authentication), for example execute with name cve.get and arguments {"id": "CVE-2026-130627"}.Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- a2a-java a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx
From 1.3.2.Final · through 1.4.0.Final
Evidence 3
Vendor advisory · 1
Establishes: Affected and fixed versions.
- Advisory
CVE record · 2
Establishes: The identifier and description.
- Record
- Record
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-130627
Is CVE-2026-130627 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. CISA's SSVC assessment notes a proof of concept exists. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
When PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is enabled, the Vert.x HTTP client's own POST redirect follower forwards the Authorization header and all other request headers, including the allowlisted API-key headers, to a redirect target on a different host.Source: github.com, cve.org
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-130627?
a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx: from 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final.Source: cve.now feed data
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions 1.3.2.Final through 1.4.0.Final of a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx are affected, but only where PostBuilder.followRedirects(true) is set, since that opt-in is off by default. Check the a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx version in the project's dependency file and search the code for followRedirects(true).Source: github.com, cve.org
How do I fix CVE-2026-130627?
Upgrade a2a-java-sdk-http-client-vertx to 1.5.0.Final or later.Source: github.com, cve.org