CVE
nerves_hub_web unauthenticated denial of service in TLS handshake
Affects nerves_hub_web from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4 when DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is unset, the default from 2.0.0. Fixed in 2.5.4.
Written by a model from the sources below. Verify against them.
CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N
- Exploited
- Proof of concept public, per CISA
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.5.4
- Who is exposed
- Default setups
Do first: Check every install: default setups are affected.
- Last modified
- Whether it needs action now or is a reference record, by fixed rules, with why. Last checked is when cve.now last re-read it.What do these mean? →
- Reference
- Last checked
- FIRST's estimate of the chance attackers exploit it in the next 30 days, updated daily.What do these mean? →
- 0.39% · 33rd percentile
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 45/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Default setups
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Attackers can remotely, without logging in, cause a denial of service in nerves-hub's nerves_hub_web by presenting a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered in NervesHub. The resulting TLS handshake loops endlessly and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.
Original description
Loop with Unreachable Exit Condition ('Infinite Loop') vulnerability in device certificate verification in nerves-hub nerves_hub_web allows an unauthenticated remote attacker to cause a denial of service via a TLS client certificate whose CA is not registered. When a client certificate chains to a root in the device endpoint's trust store but no CA in the chain is registered in NervesHub, NervesHub.SSL.decide/2 refuses it with the reason :unknown_ca. Erlang/OTP ssl reads that reason as a missing trust anchor, looks for an alternative root, finds the same root and validates again without end. The handshake process queries the database on each pass and keeps running after the client disconnects, until the node restarts.
The device endpoint trusts the public roots from CAStore unless DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set, so a client certificate from a public CA whose chain allows client authentication is sufficient. A chain that ends at a root outside the trust store is refused once.
This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.
Who should check
Operators running NervesHub nerves_hub_web from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4 with a device endpoint, including those using the default CAStore trust store.
“This issue affects nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.”
cve.now Index
- Exploitation15/40CISA rates a proof of concept as public
- Exposure22/25Default setups, reachable over the network without a login
- Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity8.2/10CVSS 8.2
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 70 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 65 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
What to do
Check every install: default setups are affected.
Upgrade to a fixed version: 2.5.4.
Workaround: Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose.
Check your systems with an agent
Paste this into a coding or ops agent. It checks your systems read-only and reports a table per asset.
Check whether my systems are affected by CVE-2026-125275 (A device certificate whose CA isn't registered can keep a TLS handshake running forever), using the cve.now data below.
Rules: work read-only. Do not run exploit code, proof-of-concept scripts or scanners that send attack payloads, and do not change any configuration, package, image or deployment. Report findings only.
What cve.now has for CVE-2026-125275 (entry last updated 2026-11-17):
Affected:
- nerves-hub nerves_hub_web: from 1.0.0, fixed in 2.5.4
- nerves-hub nerves_hub_web: from 1.0.0, fixed in 2.5.4
- nerves-hub nerves_hub_web: version range not reported
Fixed versions: 2.5.4.
Conditions (all must be true for the bug to be hit):
- The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store. (source: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275)
- DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is unset (default from 2.0.0), so the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. (source: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275)
- nerves_hub versions from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. (source: https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-125275.html)
- Erlang/OTP ssl retry confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1; earlier releases not checked. (source: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275)
Setup: the bug is reachable in a default setup; no special feature or setting is needed.
Attacker needs: network access, no login, no user action.
Workaround: Set DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE to a bundle that holds no public root and no root that signs device certificates, for example a file with one self-signed certificate made for this purpose. (source: https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275)
CISA KEV: CVE-2026-125275 is not listed as of cve.now's last read.
This KEV status is for CVE-2026-125275 only. If you also check another CVE, look up its own KEV status; never assume it from this one.
How to check:
- Installed software: check what is actually running, not what a repo declares. Read the version from each host, container image and Kubernetes node (the binary's version output, the OS package database, image layers), and check whether the conditions above hold there. Distribution packages may carry a backported fix under an older version number; confirm against the distribution's own advisory.
Verify against the linked advisories before concluding, and cite the date you read each one:
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/security/advisories/GHSA-8j48-4mg5-7v6v
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/064e78cc189dd9b87748746f44179632a52ddf58
- https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2026-125275.html
- https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2026-125275
- https://github.com/nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web/commit/a49fb8875f3aab40062881028ef4e406d985aaa9
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-125275
Do not conclude an asset is unaffected unless you checked it and the evidence covers both its version and the conditions above. If you could not check something, mark it unknown and say what is missing.
Report a table with one row per asset and these columns: Asset | Version or build | Status (affected, fixed, not applicable, unknown) | Compensating controls | Exposure (internet-facing, internal, none) | Evidence | Next action.
Entry: https://cve.now/CVE-2026-125275
For follow-up questions, use the cve.now MCP server at https://mcp.cve.now/mcp (no authentication), for example execute with name cve.get and arguments {"id": "CVE-2026-125275"}.Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- nerves-hub
From 1.0.0 · fixed in 2.5.4
- nerves_hub
From 1.0.0 · fixed in 2.5.4
- nerves-hub/nerves_hub_web
Version range not reported
Evidence 7
Vendor advisory · 1
Establishes: Affected and fixed versions.
- Advisory
CVE record · 2
Establishes: The identifier and description.
- Record
- Record
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-125275
Is CVE-2026-125275 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. CISA's SSVC assessment notes a proof of concept exists. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What does this mean?
A device certificate whose certificate authority is not registered can keep a TLS handshake running indefinitely. The handshake process keeps querying the database after the client disconnects, until the node restarts, which causes a denial of service.Source: cve.org, cna.erlef.org
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-125275?
nerves-hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. nerves_hub: from 1.0.0 before 2.5.4.Source: cve.now feed data
Am I affected, and how do I check?
nerves_hub is affected from version 1.0.0 before 2.5.4. The certificate chain must end at a root in the device endpoint's trust store, which is the case when DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is unset (the default from 2.0.0) and the trust store holds the public roots from CAStore. The Erlang/OTP ssl retry was confirmed on Erlang/OTP 28.3, 29.0 and 29.1, and earlier releases were not checked. To check, look at the nerves_hub_web version and at whether DEVICE_SSL_CACERTFILE is set in the environment.Source: cve.org, cna.erlef.org
How do I fix CVE-2026-125275?
Upgrade nerves_hub_web to 2.5.4 or later, which is the listed fixed version. No vendor patch ids are named.Source: cve.org, cna.erlef.org