Beta9 build sandbox escape via chroot-only isolation
Beta9 worker versions before 0.1.756 are affected when the worker image sets Buildah isolation to chroot. The fix is in 0.1.756.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- Published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 18/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.1.756
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Beta9, the open-source platform for running tenant workloads, is affected through its image build workers, which run user-submitted build steps with only filesystem-root isolation. A tenant who can submit an image build could reach the worker's container filesystem and the credentials and container runtime binaries stored there, potentially gaining control over the host-level worker environment.
Read the original description
Beta9 turns each shell command in a tenant image definition into a Dockerfile RUN line and executes it with Buildah on the build worker. The worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION=chroot, and no buildah invocation passes --isolation, so the step only changes its filesystem root. It keeps the worker pod's PID, network, IPC, and user namespaces, runs as uid 0, and holds CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE. PID 1 in that procfs is the worker entrypoint, so /proc/1/root is the worker container's filesystem and is writable. That filesystem contains the runc, buildah, and runsc binaries the worker uses to start tenant containers, the worker's Kubernetes service account token, and the host directories mounted into the pod. Worker pods are privileged. Clip v2 layered builds are the default, so a tenant with a workspace token reaches this by submitting one image build. The read-only proof confirmed the shared namespaces, CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE, and that the worker's runc binary is visible at /proc/1/root. Fixed in worker 0.1.756: Buildah RUN steps, including the WORKDIR mkdir, use OCI isolation with private PID, IPC, and network namespaces, and tenant ARG values are passed only into the build container.
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
Worker image sets Buildah isolation to chroot (before the fix)Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.1.756.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- Posted on X by cve.now
Affected versions
- github.com/beam-cloud/beta9
fixed in 0.1.756
Evidence 4
- Patch
- Patch
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-120306
What does this mean?
Beta9 build sandboxes relied on chroot-only isolation, so tenant inputs could escape the worker and inherit privileged namespaces.Source: github.com, github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Beta9 worker versions before 0.1.756 are listed as affected, under the condition that the worker image sets BUILDAH_ISOLATION to chroot. To check, look at the BUILDAH_ISOLATION value in the worker image.Source: github.com, github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade the Beta9 worker to 0.1.756 or later, the listed fixed version.Source: github.com, github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data