sniproxy through 0.7.0 NULL Pointer Dereference via resolv_cancel()
Affects sniproxy through 0.7.0 built with --enable-dns, when a client sends a 254 or 255 character hostname that matches a wildcard (*) backend entry. The bug crashes the daemon. No fix is listed.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Unclear
- Fix
- Fix or patch referenced
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
sniproxy, a transparent TLS and HTTP proxy daemon, is affected by this vulnerability. A remote attacker who does not need to log in can crash the service by sending a specially crafted, overly long hostname, causing the proxy to stop running.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
sniproxy through 0.7.0 contains a NULL pointer dereference vulnerability in resolv_cancel() that allows remote unauthenticated attackers to crash the daemon by sending overlong hostnames. Attackers can send a 254 or 255 character TLS SNI name or HTTP Host header matching a wildcard backend, then close the connection to terminate the proxy.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- dlundquist sniproxy
through 0.7.0
References 7
GitHub · dlundquist/sniproxy
GitHub · renaudallard/sniproxy
Questions about CVE-2026-119760
What does this mean?
A client can send a very long hostname that makes sniproxy crash with a segmentation fault in resolv_cancel(). The crash stops the daemon, which is a denial of service.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions through 0.7.0 are affected when sniproxy is built with --enable-dns and a hostname matches a table entry with a * backend. To check, look at the build options used to compile sniproxy for --enable-dns, and look at the table configuration for * backends.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
The checked facts do not name a fixed release, so no upgrade target is known from them. Check the project's advisory or release notes for a fixed version.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data