Zuke: githubWorkflow adopts any workflow run whose title matches its marker, so anyone who can dispatch the workflow can satisfy or block…
Affects Zuke's githubWorkflow gate in marker mode when the dispatched workflow's repository grants workflow_dispatch to people the gating repository does not equally trust. Fixed in 1.10.0.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 1.10.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Zuke, a Deno build automation system, is affected through its @zuke/gh githubWorkflow gate, which matches workflow runs using only a visible title marker. Someone with permission to dispatch the external workflow could copy that marker to substitute a run, letting an unvalidated release pass or a valid release get blocked.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Zuke is a code-first, strongly typed build automation system for Deno. Prior to 1.10.0, the @zuke/gh githubWorkflow(...) gate correlates a dispatched workflow run using only a display-title marker that is visible in the workflow run list and can be copied by another dispatcher. In configurations where the external workflow repository grants workflow_dispatch permission to a party not equally trusted by the releasing repository, an attacker can dispatch a run with the marker and cause the gate to adopt its conclusion without verifying the event, ref, or creation window. A passing substituted run can authorize an unvalidated release, while a failed or cancelled run can block a valid release, and the persisted adopted run ID preserves the substitution across build resume. This issue is fixed in version 1.10.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- zuke-build zuke
fixed in 1.10.0
References 4
GitHub · zuke-build/zuke
Questions about CVE-2026-119289
What does this mean?
The gate adopts any workflow run whose title matches its marker, so a substituted run can authorize a release that never passed its gate or block one that did. The substitution persists across build resume.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions of @zuke/gh before 1.10.0 are affected, but only builds that wait on githubWorkflow(...) in marker mode. The exposure also depends on whether the dispatched workflow's repository grants workflow_dispatch to people the gating repository does not equally trust. Check the @zuke/gh version in the project's dependency lockfile and whether the gate uses marker mode.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade to @zuke/gh 1.10.0. If an upgrade is not possible, treat the gate's result as advisory, require a human approval between the gate and the release, or dispatch only workflows in a repository whose actions: write holders are already trusted to release.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data