Kubeflow Pipelines: Run log streaming endpoint bypasses namespace authorization, exposing pod execution logs cross-tenant
Affects Kubeflow Pipelines 2.17.3 and earlier, where the run log streaming endpoint skips the check that a requested pod belongs to the run. Fixed in 2.18.0.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Unclear
- Fix
- Fixed in 2.18.0
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: yes
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
Kubeflow Pipelines, the machine learning workflow platform, is affected through its API server's run log endpoint. An attacker who can reach that endpoint and knows a target run ID and node or pod identifier can read logs from other users' pipeline runs or unrelated pods, potentially exposing sensitive workload data or credentials.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
Kubeflow Pipelines enables users to build and deploy portable, scalable machine learning workflows. Prior to 2.18.0, the API server's GET /apis/v1alpha1/runs/{run_id}/nodes/{node_id}/log handler retrieved logs without authorizing the caller against the selected run. A caller who can reach the backend and knows a victim run ID and suitable pod or node identifier can read live or archived logs with the API server's permissions. For live logs, the caller-controlled node ID was also accepted as a pod name without verifying that the pod belonged to the requested run, allowing a known run ID to select the namespace of an unrelated pod and read its main container logs. The handler does not authenticate requests itself, although an external authentication gate or network policy can limit reachability. Exposed logs can contain sensitive workload data or credentials. This issue is fixed in version 2.18.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- kubeflow pipelines
fixed in 2.18.0
References 4
GitHub · kubeflow/pipelines
Questions about CVE-2026-118759
What does this mean?
The run log streaming endpoint does not confirm that a requested pod belongs to the run. A caller with a known run ID can read the main container logs of an unrelated pod in the same namespace, live or archived, using the API server's permissions. These logs may contain sensitive workload data or credentials.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Versions through 2.17.3 are affected, and 2.18.0 fixes the issue. Whether the unrelated-pod read works depends on the API server's pod-log permissions, and an external authentication gate or network policy can limit reachability of the backend endpoint. To check, look at the Kubeflow Pipelines version the API server runs.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade the API server to Kubeflow Pipelines 2.18.0. Until the upgrade, restrict access to the backend log endpoint.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data