pgAdmin 4: libpq uses the pgAdmin service account's own password file and client certificate
Affects pgAdmin 4 server mode before 9.19, where a server with no password file or client certificate set could fall back to the pgAdmin service account's own credentials. Fixed in 9.19.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in 9.19
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
In server mode, pgAdmin 4 could let any user connect to a PostgreSQL server using the password file and client certificate belonging to the operating-system account that runs pgAdmin, which an attacker could exploit to access databases they should not reach. The flaw affects pgAdmin 4 releases earlier than 9.19.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
When a server in pgAdmin 4 had no password file, client certificate or client key configured, or the configured one could not be found, pgAdmin left the parameter out of the connection and libpq fell back to the defaults of the operating-system account running pgAdmin: ~/.pgpass, ~/.postgresql/postgresql.crt and postgresql.key, or PGPASSFILE, PGSSLCERT and PGSSLKEY. In server mode any user could therefore connect to a server with the service account's saved passwords or client certificate, and supplying only a copy of its public certificate was enough for libpq to pair it with the service account's private key. A pg_service.conf entry, or a maintenance database name read as a connection string by pg_dumpall, could bring the same files back for the utilities. The fix gives each of these parameters a value in server mode, the user's own file or otherwise a path that can never be opened, in the connection string, in the environment of the utilities and in the --dbname connection string that ranks above a service entry. Desktop mode is unchanged. This issue affects pgAdmin 4: before 9.19.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- pgadmin.org pgAdmin 4
fixed in 9.19
References 2
GitHub · pgadmin-org/pgadmin4
Questions about CVE-2026-116247
What does this mean?
In server mode, when a server had no password file, client certificate or client key configured, or the configured one could not be found, libpq used the pgAdmin service account's saved passwords or client certificate, so any user could connect with them. A copy of the public certificate is enough for libpq to pair it with the service account's private key.Source: github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
pgAdmin 4 versions before 9.19 running in server mode are affected; desktop mode is not. The setup matters too: it applies to servers with no passfile, sslcert or sslkey configured, and to pg_service.conf entries that set passfile, sslcert or sslkey. Check the pgAdmin version in its About dialog and look for those settings in the server definitions and pg_service.conf.Source: github.com
What should I do about it?
Upgrade pgAdmin 4 to version 9.19 or later, which contains the fix.Source: github.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data