Price manipulation in the Ecommerce Template checkout flow through a client supplied Stripe price identifier
Affects Ecommerce Template revisions from commit 2aa8ec53 until fix commit e6b364cd, where the cart endpoint accepts a client-supplied Stripe price ID without checking it matches the variant. Fixed in e6b364cd.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Fix
- Fixed in commit e6b364cd of 31 July 2026
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: none
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The Ecommerce Template by MarcosCamara01, an open-source online store project that uses Stripe for checkout, is affected. An logged-in customer can pay the price of a cheap item while ordering a more expensive product, so the store records orders for goods that were never actually paid for.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
External Control of Assumed-Immutable Web Parameter (CWE-472) in the cart and checkout flow of MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template allows an authenticated user with no special privileges to be charged the price of one product while placing an order for another, because POST /api/user/cart accepts variantId, which determines what the order records, and stripeId, which determines what Stripe charges, as two independent fields of the request body, stores both on the cart row, and no check requires the stripeId to be the one that belongs to the variantId. POST /api/stripe/payment builds the Stripe Checkout line items from the stored value, as { price: item.stripeId, quantity }, so the amount charged is the amount of that Stripe price. The checkout.session.completed webhook then creates the order products from the variantId of the same cart row, so the order records a product that was not paid for. Every stripeId in the catalogue is readable by any visitor, so no value has to be guessed. This results in orders for goods at the price of the cheapest item in the catalogue, repeatable without limit, and in order records whose amount does not correspond to the product they list.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: none · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- MarcosCamara01 Ecommerce Template
Version range not reported
References 2
GitHub · MarcosCamara01/ecommerce-template
Questions about CVE-2026-115450
What does this mean?
The cart endpoint accepts two separate fields from the request, a variant ID and a Stripe price ID, and does not check that they refer to the same product. An authenticated user with no special privileges can be charged the price of one product while the order records a different product, and this can be repeated without limit.Source: secur0.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
Revisions from commit 2aa8ec53 (16 November 2025) up to the fix in commit e6b364cd are affected. To check a copy, confirm whether its history includes commit 2aa8ec53 and whether it includes commit e6b364cd; the copy is in the affected range if it has the first and lacks the second.Source: secur0.com
What should I do about it?
Update to a revision that includes commit e6b364cd (31 July 2026). No workaround is listed in the facts.Source: secur0.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data