A russh SSH server accepts a publickey authentication whose signature uses a different algorithm than the one named in the request
- Exploited
- Proof of concept public, per CISA
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.64.0
- Who is exposed
- Not reported
Do first: Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.64.0.
- Last modified
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 20/100 · provisional
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
- Exploitation: poc
- Automatable: no
- Technical impact: partial
Summary
The russh Rust SSH server library accepts public-key signatures that use a different algorithm than the one named in the request, so a network attacker holding an authorized RSA key can announce rsa-sha2-512 while supplying an ssh-rsa SHA-1 signature. This can bypass restrictions that depend on the requested algorithm or produce misleading audit records, although a valid private-key signature is still required and russh clients are not affected.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
Read the original description
russh is a Rust SSH client and server library. From version 0.34.0-beta.1 until version 0.64.0, its SSH server does not require the signature algorithm in a public-key authentication signature to match the algorithm named in the authentication request. A client possessing an authorized RSA private key can announce rsa-sha2-512 while supplying a valid ssh-rsa SHA-1 signature, bypassing restrictions or producing misleading audit records when applications rely on the requested algorithm. A valid private-key signature remains required, and russh clients are not affected. This issue is fixed in version 0.64.0.
cve.now Index
- Exploitation15/40CISA rates a proof of concept as public
- Exposure3/25Reachable over the network · Unknown: No advisory context yet
- Reach?/20Unknown. No tracked technology or package matched
- Severity2.3/10CVSS 2.3
- No patch0/5No signal
What would change the score
- Would score about 60 if added to CISA KEV
- Would score about 55 if CISA's SSVC rates exploitation active
- Would score about 39 if advisories confirm default setups are exposed
What to do
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.64.0.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
- CISA SSVC assessment
Exploitation: poc · Automatable: no · Technical impact: partial
- Record last updated
Affected versions
- Eugeny russh
From 0.34.0-beta.1 · fixed in 0.64.0
Evidence 4
- Advisory
- Repository
- Repository
- Repository
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-111062
Is CVE-2026-111062 being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. CISA's SSVC assessment notes a proof of concept exists. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
Which versions are affected by CVE-2026-111062?
russh: from 0.34.0-beta.1 before 0.64.0.Source: cve.now feed data
How do I fix CVE-2026-111062?
Upgrade to a fixed version: 0.64.0.Source: cve.now feed data