D-Link DNS-320L/DNS-325/DNS-327L/DNS-340L HTTP GET Request nas_sharing.cgi hard-coded credentials
Affects D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L NAS devices that have reached end-of-life, which no longer receive firmware updates. No fix is available for these models.
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Listed in CISA KEV
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Actively exploited
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L, and DNS-340L network-attached storage devices are affected, specifically through their web interface's sharing configuration handler. An attacker could remotely log in using hard-coded built-in credentials, potentially gaining unauthorized control over the device and its stored data; these products are end-of-life and no longer receive vendor support.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
** UNSUPPORTED WHEN ASSIGNED ** A vulnerability, which was classified as very critical, has been found in D-Link DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L up to 20240403. This issue affects some unknown processing of the file /cgi-bin/nas_sharing.cgi of the component HTTP GET Request Handler. The manipulation of the argument user with the input messagebus leads to hard-coded credentials. The attack may be initiated remotely. The exploit has been disclosed to the public and may be used. The associated identifier of this vulnerability is VDB-259283. NOTE: This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. NOTE: Vendor was contacted early and confirmed immediately that the product is end-of-life. It should be retired and replaced.
Timeline
- CVE published
- Added to CISA KEV
CISA has evidence of exploitation in the wild
- CISA remediation deadline
Due date for US federal agencies to patch
- Record last updated
- EPSS reached 10%
FIRST estimates at least a 10% chance of exploitation in the next 30 days
Affected versions
- D-Link DNS-320L
20240403
- D-Link DNS-325
20240403
- D-Link DNS-327L
20240403
- D-Link DNS-340L
20240403
References 4
GitHub · netsecfish/dlink
supportannouncement.us.dlink.com
Questions about CVE-2024-3272
What does this mean?
The nas_sharing.cgi web interface contains hard-coded credentials, so a remote party who knows them can send a crafted HTTP GET request and run arbitrary commands on the device. The impact could include access to sensitive information, changed system settings, or a denial of service.Source: supportannouncement.us.dlink.com, github.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The listed models are DNS-320L, DNS-325, DNS-327L and DNS-340L, and the advisory limits the issue to devices that have reached end-of-life or end-of-service. To check a device, look up its model on D-Link's product lifecycle information and confirm whether it is past EOL/EOS; the facts do not list specific firmware versions.Source: supportannouncement.us.dlink.com, github.com
What should I do about it?
No fixed firmware is available for these end-of-life models, so no upgrade target can be named. Replacing the device with a currently supported D-Link product is the course the facts support.Source: supportannouncement.us.dlink.com, github.com
Is it being exploited?
Yes. CISA added it to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog on 2024-04-11, which means it has evidence of attacks. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cisa.gov, cve.now feed data
What if there's no patch?
No patch is available because these products no longer receive firmware updates or security patches. The facts do not describe a vendor workaround, so the only documented step is to limit exposure of the device, such as keeping it off untrusted networks and the internet.Source: supportannouncement.us.dlink.com, github.com