Konflux-ci: unquoted variable expansion in shell command execution
Affects the konflux-ci main branch only, where the retry() function's current callers use hardcoded commands; the exposure depends on a future code change. No fix is listed.
Written by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5 from the sources below. Verify against them.
- Exploited
- No known exploitation
- Fix
- No fix listed
- Who is exposed
- Specific setups only
Do first: Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs. The retry() function must be called with attacker-controlled input (a future code change; current callers use hardcoded commands). Affects the konflux-ci main branch.
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- Published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- A 0-100 score for how much a CVE matters across the industry: exploitation, exposure, how widely the software is used, severity and whether a fix exists.What do these mean? →
- 17/100 · provisional
- How many real-world setups can hit the bug, from the vendor's advisory and CISA data. It does not know your setup.What do these mean? →
- Specific setups only
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
Konflux-ci, a software supply chain and build platform, is affected by an improper quoting flaw in its deployment scripts. A local user who can pass arguments to these scripts could run arbitrary commands with the privileges of the deployment runner.
Read the original description
A flaw was found in konflux-ci. This vulnerability allows arbitrary code execution due to improper quoting of shell variables in deployment scripts. A local attacker who can supply arguments to the affected scripts could exploit this issue to trigger unintended command substitution, executing commands with the privileges of the deployment runner.
What to do
Check whether your setup matches what the bug needs.
The retry() function must be called with attacker-controlled input (a future code change; current callers use hardcoded commands). Affects the konflux-ci main branch.Workaround: The sources give no workaround. The practical limit is to keep retry() called only with hardcoded commands, since the risk arises only if attacker-controlled input reaches it.
Timeline
- CVE published
- First seen by cve.now
Affected versions
- konflux-ci
0.2.2, 0.2.3-rc.0
Evidence 2
- Report
- Link
Corrections
None so far.
Something wrong on this page? Report an error. Every fix is listed here.
Questions about CVE-2026-116958
What does this mean?
Shell variables in deployment scripts are not properly quoted, which allows arbitrary code execution through command substitution with the privileges of the deployment runner. The problem is only reachable if retry() is called with attacker-controlled input, which current callers do not do.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com, access.redhat.com
Am I affected, and how do I check?
The advisory lists the konflux-ci main branch as affected, and no released version ranges are given. To check, see whether the code you run is the main branch and whether its retry() function is ever called with input that is not hardcoded.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com, access.redhat.com
What should I do about it?
No fixed version is listed, so the sources give no upgrade target. Check the advisory for updates before relying on any specific release.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com, access.redhat.com
Is it being exploited?
It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked.Source: cve.now feed data
What if there's no patch?
The sources give no workaround. The practical limit is to keep retry() called only with hardcoded commands, since the risk arises only if attacker-controlled input reaches it.Source: bugzilla.redhat.com, access.redhat.com