BLAKE2b produces wrong tag when using `reset()` with a different-length key
- Published
- Last modified
- Where the record stands: published, rejected by its publisher, or superseded by another id.What do these mean? →
- published
- Whether CISA lists it in its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog: proof that attackers are using it.What do these mean? →
- Not listed in CISA KEV
- Fix
- Fixed in 0.17.16, 0.18.1
- Whether working attack code is public (Exploit-DB, Metasploit, Nuclei or GitHub). Public code makes attacks easier.What do these mean? →
- None on Exploit-DB, Metasploit or GitHub
Summary
The hazardous Rust cryptography library's BLAKE2b message authentication code implementation is affected. Calling its reset function with a key of a different length than the one used at initialization can produce an incorrect tag, causing verification to fail even when both parties are behaving honestly.
Summarized by anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5. Verify details against the original sources.
Read the original description
`hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::reset()` does not correctly reset the state when a key is supplied that has a different length than the one used upon initialization with `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::new()`, because it errorneously uses a cached length. Impact Initialization `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b` with a key of some length `N`, followed by a reset with a key of length `!= N` will produce an incorrect BLAKE2b tag, causing `hazardous::mac::blake2b::Blake2b::verify()` to fail. This means under honest protocol conditions, parties could experience failing tag verifications. Resolution Upgrade to `v0.17.16` or `v0.18.1`.
Timeline
- First seen by cve.now
- Advisory published
Affected versions
- orioncrates.io
From 0.0.0-0 · fixed in 0.17.16; From 0.18.0-0 · fixed in 0.18.1