# GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR: qbee-agent: Docker Compose build context Zip Slip writes outside context directory

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-16
- Modified: 2026-11-16

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-129237](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-129237.md): qbee-agent path traversal in Docker Compose build context extraction

## Affected versions

- go.qbee.io/agent (Go): fixed in 0.0.0-20260908095235-eb7875f0a849

## Description

## Summary

`qbee-agent` contains a Zip Slip vulnerability in `app/utils/tar.go`. The tar extractor checks whether an entry remains inside the destination directory with:

```go
strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean)
```

This does not enforce a path separator boundary. If the destination directory is `/tmp/.../context`, a tar entry such as `../context-outside/payload.txt` cleans to `/tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt` and still passes the prefix check. qbee-agent then creates the outside directory and writes the payload outside the intended extraction root.

The issue is reachable through the Docker Compose build context path when `UseContext` is enabled.

## Details

Code references below were verified against `qbee-io/qbee-agent` commit:

- `1d8bdbb7422adb4ca563d3114cbe2817d6ba3581`

Affected repository:

- `qbee-io/qbee-agent`

Affected files:

- `app/utils/tar.go`
- Docker Compose context path in `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go`

The vulnerable extraction code:

- `app/utils/tar.go:89-93`

```go
targetPath := filepath.Clean(filepath.Join(destPath, header.Name))
destdirClean := filepath.Clean(destPath)

if !strings.HasPrefix(targetPath, destdirClean) {
    return fmt.Errorf("tar entry %s is outside of destination directory %s", targetPath, destdirClean)
}
```

The file is then created at the accepted `targetPath`:

- `app/utils/tar.go:96-109`

```go
case tar.TypeDir:
    if err := os.MkdirAll(targetPath, 0755); err != nil {
        return err
    }
case tar.TypeReg:
    targetFile, err := os.Create(targetPath)
```

Docker Compose build contexts reach this extractor:

- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose.go:238-270`

The context archive is downloaded and then unpacked into the compose project context directory with `utils.UnpackTar`.

Archive source and role evidence:

- `app/configuration/compose.go:14` defines the Docker Compose build context as the remote configuration field `Context string`.
- `app/configuration/compose.go:26` enables this path with `UseContext`.
- `app/configuration/file_manager.go:240-246` and `app/configuration/file_manager.go:281-287` show that context sources are resolved either from `file://` local files or from the Qbee file-manager API.
- Qbee's Docker Compose documentation lists "Build Context" as a Docker Compose configuration option: https://docs.qbee.io/configuration-docker-compose.html
- Qbee's RBAC documentation separates `configuration:manage` from `files:manage`, and maps "Configure -> Modify configuration" to `configuration:manage` while "Files manager -> Write access" maps to `files:manage`: https://docs.qbee.io/account-users-and-roles.html
- Qbee's CI/CD documentation describes using a dedicated Qbee user with a role restricted to configuration changes to push and commit deployment configuration: https://docs.qbee.io/tutorial-iot-container-deployment-with-ci-cd-devops.html

Trust-boundary requirement:

- The vulnerable primitive is clear: qbee-agent writes a regular file outside the intended context extraction directory.
- The security boundary is present when the archive supplier is less privileged than the local qbee-agent process and is not supposed to write arbitrary sibling files in qbee-agent's Docker Compose cache/project area.
- The public code and documentation support this boundary for tenants that delegate configuration and/or file-manager access to limited users or CI automation.
- If a deployment allows only full device/fleet administrators to provide Docker Compose context archives, the finding should be treated as hardening for that deployment.

## PoC

Two failing regression tests add.

The utility-level test proves the extractor bug directly:

- `app/utils/tar_test.go:132`
- `Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass`

Command:

```sh
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/utils -run Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass -count=1 -v'
```

Observed result:

```text
=== RUN   Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass
    tar_test.go:169: expected unpackTar to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
    tar_test.go:174: path traversal: payload was written outside destPath at /tmp/.../context-outside/payload.txt; got "zip-slip-sibling-prefix"
--- FAIL: Test_TarZipSlipSiblingPrefixBypass (0.00s)
FAIL
```

The Docker Compose bundle-path test proves reachability through `Compose.getContext()`:

- `app/configuration/bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:13`
- `Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip`

Command:

```sh
wsl -e sh -lc 'cd /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/targets/qbee-agent; /mnt/c/Users/kwak0/Documents/Qbee/.tools/go1.26.4-linux/go/bin/go test ./app/configuration -run Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip -count=1 -v'
```

Observed result:

```text
=== RUN   Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip
    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:66: expected compose context unpack to reject sibling-prefix traversal archive
    bundle_docker_compose_context_zip_slip_test.go:75: compose context path traversal wrote outside context dir at /tmp/.../cache/docker_compose/project-a/context-outside/payload.txt; got "compose-context-zip-slip"
--- FAIL: Test_ComposeContextRejectsSiblingPrefixZipSlip (0.00s)
FAIL
```

## Impact

An attacker-controlled Docker Compose build context archive can create directories and regular files outside qbee-agent's intended context extraction directory, with qbee-agent process privileges.

The demonstrated impact is constrained path traversal:

- It can write sibling-prefix paths such as `cache/docker_compose/<project>/context-outside/payload.txt`.
- It does not demonstrate writing arbitrary paths such as `/etc/passwd`; those do not pass the current string-prefix check.
- It can corrupt or alter files in nearby qbee-agent Docker Compose cache/project paths if their cleaned path shares the destination prefix.
- It may affect integrity or availability of qbee-agent-managed Docker Compose state, depending on the project/cache layout.

This report does not claim direct RCE.

## References

- https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/security/advisories/GHSA-vx32-xf7g-9ghr
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129237
- https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/pull/148
- https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/commit/eb7875f0a849cb33325956d0b75e27061d7a7fa3
- https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent
- https://github.com/qbee-io/qbee-agent/releases/tag/2026.41

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-VX32-XF7G-9GHR
