# GHSA-VF85-8FF2-3R9W: django-filer: Missing per-object authorization on discard and edit\_redirect version transitions

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 4.3 (Medium)
- Published: 2026-11-18
- Modified: 2026-11-18

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-69131](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-69131.md): django-filer IDOR in folder permissions allows unauthorized deletion

## Affected versions

- django-filer (PyPI): fixed in 3.5.0

## Description

## Summary

When django-filer's optional per-folder permission system is enabled (`FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS=True`), the "Delete files and/or folders" admin action does **not** enforce per-folder edit permissions the way every other mutating action does. A staff user who is scoped **read-only** on a folder via `FolderPermission` (`can_edit = DENY`), but who holds the global Django model-level `delete_*` permission, can delete files and entire subfolders inside that folder — even though their move, rename, copy, and resize actions on the same folder are correctly denied.

This is an integrity / edit-control gap (unauthorized deletion). It is **not** a read-confidentiality issue: filer files are world-downloadable by design, so no confidentiality claim is made.

## Affected versions

- django-filer `<= 3.4.4` (verified end-to-end on 3.4.4 and on `master` prior to   the fix).

Only installations running with `FILER_ENABLE_PERMISSIONS = True` (the optional per-folder `FolderPermission` system) are affected. Deployments that leave permissions disabled (the default) rely solely on Django model-level permissions and are not impacted by this specific gap.

## Patched versions

- Fixed in PR [#1605](https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605).   Upgrade to the first release containing that commit (`3.5.0` or later).

## Details

The `delete_files_or_folders` admin action in `filer/admin/folderadmin.py` authorized deletion using only:

1. `self.has_delete_permission(request)` — which returns `True` for `obj=None`, and
2. the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image`    permission (enforced downstream by the admin delete machinery).

It never called `check_folder_edit_permissions` or `check_files_edit_permissions`. Every sibling mutating action — move, rename, copy, resize — *does* call these helpers, which walk the selected objects (and their descendants) and enforce the per-folder `can_edit` grant from `FolderPermission`.

Because `FolderPermission` has no dedicated `can_delete` field, deletion is treated as an edit/management operation and is gated elsewhere on `can_edit`. The delete action's omission therefore let a folder-scoped read-only user bypass the per-folder control that constrains all their other write operations.

### Precondition 

The attacker must hold the Django model-level `delete_file` / `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission. A purely read-only user (no model-level delete perm) receives `403` and cannot exploit this. This precondition matches the standard folder-scoped-staff deployment model, where staff hold model-level permissions and are further constrained per-folder by `FolderPermission`. 

## Mitigation

- Upgrade to the patched release.
- Until upgrading, avoid granting the model-level `delete_file` /
  `delete_folder` / `delete_image` permission to staff who are meant to be
  read-only on specific folders via `FolderPermission`.

## Credit

Reported through coordinated disclosure. Fixed in PR #1605.

## References

- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/security/advisories/GHSA-vf85-8ff2-3r9w
- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/pull/1605
- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/29d20ec0de13d7f77fa2cea93166f8d50a3f508d
- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/commit/742ba4c3094dd75e586ca3a05e6ad2703de4553b
- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer
- https://github.com/django-cms/django-filer/releases/tag/3.5.0

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-VF85-8FF2-3R9W
