# GHSA-JC42-994R-VVWP: cassandra-jdbc-wrapper: Authentication Token Exposed in Logs

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-19
- Modified: 2026-11-19

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-73504](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-73504.md): cassandra-jdbc-wrapper auth token leak in DEBUG logs

## Affected versions

- com.ing.data:cassandra-jdbc-wrapper (Maven): from 5.0.0, fixed in 5.0.2
- com.ing.data:cassandra-jdbc-wrapper (Maven): fixed in 4.16.4

## Description

### Summary
The fix for [AIKIDO-2024-10565](https://intel.aikido.dev/cve/AIKIDO-2024-10565) (plaintext password logging) introduced two
redaction helpers — `DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues()` and
`DriverUtil.redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl()` — but both helpers only redact
the `"password"` property/parameter (`JdbcUrlUtil.TAG_PASSWORD`). The equally
sensitive `"token"` property (`JdbcUrlUtil.TAG_TOKEN`), used for DataStax
Astra and other token-based Cassandra authentication, is completely unredacted
by both helpers. Applications using token-based authentication with DEBUG
logging enabled will therefore log the live authentication token in plaintext
via `SessionHolder`'s calls to these same two helpers — the exact same
exposure pattern that the original fix was intended to prevent.

### Details
**File:** `src/main/java/com/ing/data/cassandra/jdbc/utils/DriverUtil.java`

```java
// toStringWithoutSensitiveValues (lines 341-347) -- only redacts "password"
public static String toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(final Properties properties) {
    final Properties withRedactedSensitiveValues = (Properties) properties.clone();
    if (withRedactedSensitiveValues.containsKey(TAG_PASSWORD)) {
        withRedactedSensitiveValues.setProperty(TAG_PASSWORD, "***");
    }
    return withRedactedSensitiveValues.toString();
}

// redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl (lines 355-378) -- only redacts "password"
final String redactedQuery = Arrays.stream(...)
    .map(param -> {
        if (param.startsWith(TAG_PASSWORD + "=")) {
            return TAG_PASSWORD + "=***";
        }
        return param;     // <-- "token=..." passes through unmodified
    })
    ...
```

`JdbcUrlUtil.java` defines `TAG_TOKEN = "token"` (line 407) as a separate,
distinct connection property used when connecting with DataStax Astra-style
token-based authentication. Neither redaction helper checks for this key.

**File:** `src/main/java/com/ing/data/cassandra/jdbc/SessionHolder.java`

Both helpers are called on connection-level properties at DEBUG log level:

```java
// Line 150 — logs all connection properties including "token" unredacted
log.debug("Final Properties to Connection: {}",
    toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(this.properties));

// Lines 173, 190 — logs JDBC URL including "?token=..." unredacted
final String jdbcUrl = redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl(this.cacheKey.get(URL_KEY));
log.debug("Released last reference to {}, closing Session.", jdbcUrl);
log.debug("Acquired reference to {}, new count = {}.", jdbcUrl, ref + 1);
```

DEBUG logging is commonly enabled in production troubleshooting and staging
environments, meaning the token is logged in plain text every time a
connection is acquired or released in such environments.

### PoC
**Environment:** JDK 17+, Maven 3.x

**pom.xml dependency:**
```xml
<dependency>
    <groupId>com.ing.data</groupId>
    <artifactId>cassandra-jdbc-wrapper</artifactId>
    <version>5.0.1</version>
</dependency>
```

**Exploit.java:**
```java
import com.ing.data.cassandra.jdbc.utils.DriverUtil;
import java.util.Properties;

public class Exploit {
    public static void main(String[] args) throws Exception {
        String secretToken = "AstraCS:SUPER_SECRET_TOKEN_VALUE_1234567890";

        // Test 1: redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl()
        String urlWithToken = "jdbc:cassandra://host:9042/ks?token=" + secretToken;
        String redacted = DriverUtil.redactSensitiveValuesInJdbcUrl(urlWithToken);
        System.out.println("Token in 'redacted' URL: " + redacted.contains(secretToken)); // true

        // Test 2: toStringWithoutSensitiveValues()
        Properties props = new Properties();
        props.setProperty("token", secretToken);
        String redactedProps = DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(props);
        System.out.println("Token in 'redacted' props: " + redactedProps.contains(secretToken)); // true

        // Control: password IS correctly redacted
        Properties propsWithPassword = new Properties();
        propsWithPassword.setProperty("password", "secret");
        System.out.println("Password redacted: " +
            !DriverUtil.toStringWithoutSensitiveValues(propsWithPassword).contains("secret")); // true
    }
}
```

**Result (confirmed, 3/3 reproductions on cassandra-jdbc-wrapper 5.0.1, the latest release):**

```
Token in 'redacted' URL:   true   <- token leaks through the URL redactor
Token in 'redacted' props: true   <- token leaks through the property redactor
Password redacted:         true   <- password IS correctly masked (control)
```

The "redacted" output for a token-based connection string is byte-for-byte
identical to the unredacted original — the helpers have no effect on `token`.

### Impact
**Vulnerability type:** Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File (CWE-532).

An authentication token (functionally equivalent in sensitivity to a password
— it grants full access to the Cassandra cluster) is written in plaintext to
application log files whenever:
- The application uses token-based authentication (e.g., DataStax Astra), AND
- DEBUG logging is enabled (common in staging environments and during
  production troubleshooting sessions).

An attacker who can read log files — via log aggregation system access,
misconfigured log storage, or a separate log-reading vulnerability — can
extract a live authentication token and use it to authenticate directly to
the Cassandra cluster, accessing all data the token is authorized to read or
write.

This is exactly the same impact class as the original AIKIDO-2024-10565 fix
was intended to prevent — the fix simply missed a second sensitive credential
type that was already present in the codebase.

## References

- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper/security/advisories/GHSA-jc42-994r-vvwp
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-73504
- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper/commit/0b7ea0322e538304119f58f1214e4171312b245b
- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper/commit/ace58f7cf5c981d8dfe302f1a514ae4c6f827f38
- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper
- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper/releases/tag/v4.16.4
- https://github.com/ing-bank/cassandra-jdbc-wrapper/releases/tag/v5.0.2

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-JC42-994R-VVWP
