# GHSA-J79F-JRWM-2F2H: Authenticated path traversal to arbitrary file write via S/MIME certificate CN in SMTP settings

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 6.0 (Medium)
- Published: 2026-08-30
- Modified: 2026-09-22

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-94563](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-94563.md): NukeViet arbitrary file write via path traversal in SMTP settings

## Affected versions

- nukeviet/nukeviet (Packagist): from 4.5.00, through 4.6.00

## Description

## Summary
When an authenticated non-super administrator (settings-module admin) adds an S/MIME signing certificate via the `smimeadd` handler (`admin/settings/smtp.php:220-296`), the on-disk output filename is derived **entirely from the certificate's X.509 Subject CN** with only `str_replace('@','__')` applied. Because an X.509 CN may legally contain `/` and `..`, an attacker who crafts a self-signed cert with a traversal CN writes attacker-controlled PEM data to an attacker-chosen path (constrained to `.key`/`.crt`/`.pem` extensions, within already-existing writable directories).

This is a distinct, unpatched sink — the write-side analogue of a previously fixed delete-side path-traversal class — in a file the prior fix never touched.

## Root Cause
`admin/settings/smtp.php` `smimeadd` handler:
- `openssl_pkcs12_read` + `openssl_x509_parse` extract the Subject CN (:268).
- The ONLY transform is `$email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN))` (:269). No `basename`, `realpath`, `nv_is_file`, `dirname`, `strpos`, or allowlist regex between the CN and the sinks (grep of :244-296 confirms).
- `file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>)` at :283/:284/:287.
- `/` and `..` in the CN survive `openssl_x509_parse` verbatim (empirically verified with OpenSSL 3 + PHP): `CN=../../config/config` → resolved write path `/data/certs/../../config/config.crt`, escaping `data/certs`.
- Reachability: `smtp.php:12` gate is `NV_IS_MODADMIN`; `op=smtp` is unconditional in `$allow_func` (`admin/settings/functions.php:16`). The `settings` module is seeded (`install/data.php:18`) with `act_1=1, act_2=1, act_3=0`, so it is reachable by default to a level-2 SPADMIN (non-GODADMIN).
- The `smimesign` purpose guard (:256) is satisfied by `extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection`; `checkss` is a per-user CSRF token — neither constrains the CN.

## Impact
Arbitrary-directory file write (existing writable dirs, `.key`/`.crt`/`.pem` extension, attacker-controlled PEM content) by a non-super administrator.
- **Unconditional (always-on):** overwrite the DKIM signing key `data/certs/nv_dkim.<domain>.private.pem` (set `CN=nv_dkim.<domain>.private` + an `extracerts` chain; the `.crt` overwrite pre-check does not gate the `.pem` sink) → mail-signing key compromise/forgery (integrity + availability of mail signing).
- **Conditional ceiling (`curl.cainfo` php.ini directive empty — the common default):** `data/certs/cacert.pem` (the shipped 203 KB Mozilla CA bundle) is used as `CURLOPT_CAINFO`/`cafile` for outbound HTTPS (`includes/functions.php:2200-2202`). Set `CN=cacert` with a rogue chain → overwrite the CA bundle → outbound-TLS verification bypass / MITM.

**Privileged-precondition test cleared:** a level-2 SPADMIN does NOT already possess a designed arbitrary-file-write/RCE primitive — every designed executable-write surface is either in an `act_2=0` module or behind an additional `NV_IS_GODADMIN` op-gate (PHP extensions are hard-force-forbidden even for GODADMIN). This handler therefore grants a NEW capability → a genuine security boundary is crossed.

## Proof of Concept
```
# 1. Craft cert with traversal CN + S/MIME EKU, export legacy-compatible PKCS#12
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout k.pem -out c.pem -days 1 -nodes \
  -config cnf   # cnf: CN=../../config/config, extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection
openssl pkcs12 -export -in c.pem -inkey k.pem -passout pass:x -out p.p12 \
  -certpbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -keypbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -macalg sha1

# 2. POST p.p12 to admin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtp with smimeadd=1, passphrase, valid checkss
#    Observed: CN=cacert -> data/certs/cacert.crt; CN=../../config/config -> config/config.crt;
#              CN=../../install/pwn -> install/pwn.crt  (all SUCCESS; escaped data/certs)
```

## Attack Chain
1. **Entry:** authenticated non-GODADMIN admin with the `settings` module POSTs a crafted `.p12` to `admin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtp` with `smimeadd=1`, passphrase, valid `checkss`. **Guard:** `NV_IS_MODADMIN` (smtp.php:12) + `op=smtp` in `$allow_func` + `checkss` CSRF token + upload ext in `{pfx,p12}`. **Bypass proof:** all are auth/CSRF/wrapper guards; none constrain the CN; actor legitimately holds the settings module.
2. **Process:** `openssl_pkcs12_read` → `openssl_x509_parse` → CN read at :268; purpose guard `$purpose[0]=='1' and $purpose[2]=='smimesign'` at :256. **Bypass proof:** `extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection` → `purposes` reports `smimesign` enabled (verified empirically).
3. **Sink:** `$email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN))`; `file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>)` (:269-287). **Guard:** none between CN and sink (only `@`→`__`). **Bypass proof:** grep shows `str_replace` is the sole transform; `..`,`/`,`.` pass through (empirically `CN=../../config/config` → `/data/certs/../../config/config.crt`).
4. **Impact:** arbitrary-directory file write (existing dirs, `.crt/.key/.pem`, attacker PEM content). Unconditional: corrupt DKIM signing key / cert assets (I:H, A:L). Conditional (`curl.cainfo` empty): overwrite `cacert.pem` → outbound-TLS MITM (adds C:L).

## Bypass Evidence
- grep of smtp.php :244-296 for `basename|realpath|preg_match|nv_is_file|nv_check|in_array|dirname|strpos|escape` → only match is `str_replace('@','__')` at :269.
- Empirically verified (OpenSSL 3 + PHP): `CN=../../config/config` survives `openssl_x509_parse` verbatim; resolved write lands at `config/config.crt` (outside `data/certs`); `purposes_enabled` includes `smimesign`.
- Version: `git log 4.6.00..HEAD -- admin/settings/smtp.php` empty (identical on latest tag and HEAD); pattern present since 4.5.00. The prior path-traversal fix (commit `27ba63c32`) touches only `modules/comment/admin/edit.php` + `install/tpl/step1.tpl` — NOT smtp.php.

## Affected Versions
`>= 4.5.00, <= 4.6.00` (S/MIME cert feature introduced in commit `d1f74a5be`, first shipped in 4.5.00; code byte-identical through latest tag 4.6.00 and HEAD).

## Suggested Fix
Apply `basename()` to the CN-derived name, or validate it with `nv_is_file` / a strict `^[A-Za-z0-9._@-]+$` allowlist before building the `.key/.crt/.pem` paths — the same `nv_is_file` containment the prior fix added to the comment module.

---
Reported by **zx (Jace)** — GitHub: @manus-use

## References

- https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-j79f-jrwm-2f2h

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-J79F-JRWM-2F2H
