Authenticated path traversal to arbitrary file write via S/MIME certificate CN in SMTP settings
Description
When an authenticated non-super administrator (settings-module admin) adds an S/MIME signing certificate via the smimeadd handler (admin/settings/smtp.php:220-296), the on-disk output filename is derived entirely from the certificate's X.509 Subject CN with only str_replace('@','__') applied. Because an X.509 CN may legally contain / and .., an attacker who crafts a self-signed cert with a traversal CN writes attacker-controlled PEM data to an attacker-chosen path (constrained to .key/.crt/.pem extensions, within already-existing writable directories).
This is a distinct, unpatched sink — the write-side analogue of a previously fixed delete-side path-traversal class — in a file the prior fix never touched.
Root Cause
admin/settings/smtp.php smimeadd handler:
openssl_pkcs12_read+openssl_x509_parseextract the Subject CN (:268).- The ONLY transform is
$email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN))(:269). Nobasename,realpath,nv_is_file,dirname,strpos, or allowlist regex between the CN and the sinks (grep of :244-296 confirms). file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>)at :283/:284/:287./and..in the CN surviveopenssl_x509_parseverbatim (empirically verified with OpenSSL 3 + PHP):CN=../../config/config→ resolved write path/data/certs/../../config/config.crt, escapingdata/certs.- Reachability:
smtp.php:12gate isNV_IS_MODADMIN;op=smtpis unconditional in$allow_func(admin/settings/functions.php:16). Thesettingsmodule is seeded (install/data.php:18) withact_1=1, act_2=1, act_3=0, so it is reachable by default to a level-2 SPADMIN (non-GODADMIN). - The
smimesignpurpose guard (:256) is satisfied byextendedKeyUsage=emailProtection;checkssis a per-user CSRF token — neither constrains the CN.
Impact
Arbitrary-directory file write (existing writable dirs, .key/.crt/.pem extension, attacker-controlled PEM content) by a non-super administrator.
- Unconditional (always-on): overwrite the DKIM signing key
data/certs/nv_dkim.<domain>.private.pem(setCN=nv_dkim.<domain>.private+ anextracertschain; the.crtoverwrite pre-check does not gate the.pemsink) → mail-signing key compromise/forgery (integrity + availability of mail signing). - Conditional ceiling (
curl.cainfophp.ini directive empty — the common default):data/certs/cacert.pem(the shipped 203 KB Mozilla CA bundle) is used asCURLOPT_CAINFO/cafilefor outbound HTTPS (includes/functions.php:2200-2202). SetCN=cacertwith a rogue chain → overwrite the CA bundle → outbound-TLS verification bypass / MITM.
Privileged-precondition test cleared: a level-2 SPADMIN does NOT already possess a designed arbitrary-file-write/RCE primitive — every designed executable-write surface is either in an act_2=0 module or behind an additional NV_IS_GODADMIN op-gate (PHP extensions are hard-force-forbidden even for GODADMIN). This handler therefore grants a NEW capability → a genuine security boundary is crossed.
Proof of Concept
# 1. Craft cert with traversal CN + S/MIME EKU, export legacy-compatible PKCS#12
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout k.pem -out c.pem -days 1 -nodes \
-config cnf # cnf: CN=../../config/config, extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection
openssl pkcs12 -export -in c.pem -inkey k.pem -passout pass:x -out p.p12 \
-certpbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -keypbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -macalg sha1
# 2. POST p.p12 to admin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtp with smimeadd=1, passphrase, valid checkss
# Observed: CN=cacert -> data/certs/cacert.crt; CN=../../config/config -> config/config.crt;
# CN=../../install/pwn -> install/pwn.crt (all SUCCESS; escaped data/certs)Attack Chain
- Entry: authenticated non-GODADMIN admin with the
settingsmodule POSTs a crafted.p12toadmin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtpwithsmimeadd=1, passphrase, validcheckss. Guard:NV_IS_MODADMIN(smtp.php:12) +op=smtpin$allow_func+checkssCSRF token + upload ext in{pfx,p12}. Bypass proof: all are auth/CSRF/wrapper guards; none constrain the CN; actor legitimately holds the settings module. - Process:
openssl_pkcs12_read→openssl_x509_parse→ CN read at :268; purpose guard$purpose[0]=='1' and $purpose[2]=='smimesign'at :256. Bypass proof:extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection→purposesreportssmimesignenabled (verified empirically). - Sink:
$email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN));file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>)(:269-287). Guard: none between CN and sink (only@→__). Bypass proof: grep showsstr_replaceis the sole transform;..,/,.pass through (empiricallyCN=../../config/config→/data/certs/../../config/config.crt). - Impact: arbitrary-directory file write (existing dirs,
.crt/.key/.pem, attacker PEM content). Unconditional: corrupt DKIM signing key / cert assets (I:H, A:L). Conditional (curl.cainfoempty): overwritecacert.pem→ outbound-TLS MITM (adds C:L).
Bypass Evidence
- grep of smtp.php :244-296 for
basename|realpath|preg_match|nv_is_file|nv_check|in_array|dirname|strpos|escape→ only match isstr_replace('@','__')at :269. - Empirically verified (OpenSSL 3 + PHP):
CN=../../config/configsurvivesopenssl_x509_parseverbatim; resolved write lands atconfig/config.crt(outsidedata/certs);purposes_enabledincludessmimesign. - Version:
git log 4.6.00..HEAD -- admin/settings/smtp.phpempty (identical on latest tag and HEAD); pattern present since 4.5.00. The prior path-traversal fix (commit27ba63c32) touches onlymodules/comment/admin/edit.php+install/tpl/step1.tpl— NOT smtp.php.
Affected Versions
>= 4.5.00, <= 4.6.00 (S/MIME cert feature introduced in commit d1f74a5be, first shipped in 4.5.00; code byte-identical through latest tag 4.6.00 and HEAD).
Suggested Fix
Apply basename() to the CN-derived name, or validate it with nv_is_file / a strict ^[A-Za-z0-9._@-]+$ allowlist before building the .key/.crt/.pem paths — the same nv_is_file containment the prior fix added to the comment module.
--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use