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Authenticated path traversal to arbitrary file write via S/MIME certificate CN in SMTP settings

GHSA-J79F-JRWM-2F2HPublished Updated GitHub

Description

When an authenticated non-super administrator (settings-module admin) adds an S/MIME signing certificate via the smimeadd handler (admin/settings/smtp.php:220-296), the on-disk output filename is derived entirely from the certificate's X.509 Subject CN with only str_replace('@','__') applied. Because an X.509 CN may legally contain / and .., an attacker who crafts a self-signed cert with a traversal CN writes attacker-controlled PEM data to an attacker-chosen path (constrained to .key/.crt/.pem extensions, within already-existing writable directories).

This is a distinct, unpatched sink — the write-side analogue of a previously fixed delete-side path-traversal class — in a file the prior fix never touched.

Root Cause

admin/settings/smtp.php smimeadd handler:

  • openssl_pkcs12_read + openssl_x509_parse extract the Subject CN (:268).
  • The ONLY transform is $email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN)) (:269). No basename, realpath, nv_is_file, dirname, strpos, or allowlist regex between the CN and the sinks (grep of :244-296 confirms).
  • file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>) at :283/:284/:287.
  • / and .. in the CN survive openssl_x509_parse verbatim (empirically verified with OpenSSL 3 + PHP): CN=../../config/config → resolved write path /data/certs/../../config/config.crt, escaping data/certs.
  • Reachability: smtp.php:12 gate is NV_IS_MODADMIN; op=smtp is unconditional in $allow_func (admin/settings/functions.php:16). The settings module is seeded (install/data.php:18) with act_1=1, act_2=1, act_3=0, so it is reachable by default to a level-2 SPADMIN (non-GODADMIN).
  • The smimesign purpose guard (:256) is satisfied by extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection; checkss is a per-user CSRF token — neither constrains the CN.

Impact

Arbitrary-directory file write (existing writable dirs, .key/.crt/.pem extension, attacker-controlled PEM content) by a non-super administrator.

  • Unconditional (always-on): overwrite the DKIM signing key data/certs/nv_dkim.<domain>.private.pem (set CN=nv_dkim.<domain>.private + an extracerts chain; the .crt overwrite pre-check does not gate the .pem sink) → mail-signing key compromise/forgery (integrity + availability of mail signing).
  • Conditional ceiling (curl.cainfo php.ini directive empty — the common default): data/certs/cacert.pem (the shipped 203 KB Mozilla CA bundle) is used as CURLOPT_CAINFO/cafile for outbound HTTPS (includes/functions.php:2200-2202). Set CN=cacert with a rogue chain → overwrite the CA bundle → outbound-TLS verification bypass / MITM.

Privileged-precondition test cleared: a level-2 SPADMIN does NOT already possess a designed arbitrary-file-write/RCE primitive — every designed executable-write surface is either in an act_2=0 module or behind an additional NV_IS_GODADMIN op-gate (PHP extensions are hard-force-forbidden even for GODADMIN). This handler therefore grants a NEW capability → a genuine security boundary is crossed.

Proof of Concept

# 1. Craft cert with traversal CN + S/MIME EKU, export legacy-compatible PKCS#12
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout k.pem -out c.pem -days 1 -nodes \
  -config cnf   # cnf: CN=../../config/config, extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection
openssl pkcs12 -export -in c.pem -inkey k.pem -passout pass:x -out p.p12 \
  -certpbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -keypbe PBE-SHA1-3DES -macalg sha1

# 2. POST p.p12 to admin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtp with smimeadd=1, passphrase, valid checkss
#    Observed: CN=cacert -> data/certs/cacert.crt; CN=../../config/config -> config/config.crt;
#              CN=../../install/pwn -> install/pwn.crt  (all SUCCESS; escaped data/certs)

Attack Chain

  1. Entry: authenticated non-GODADMIN admin with the settings module POSTs a crafted .p12 to admin/index.php?nv=settings&op=smtp with smimeadd=1, passphrase, valid checkss. Guard: NV_IS_MODADMIN (smtp.php:12) + op=smtp in $allow_func + checkss CSRF token + upload ext in {pfx,p12}. Bypass proof: all are auth/CSRF/wrapper guards; none constrain the CN; actor legitimately holds the settings module.
  2. Process: openssl_pkcs12_read → openssl_x509_parse → CN read at :268; purpose guard $purpose[0]=='1' and $purpose[2]=='smimesign' at :256. Bypass proof: extendedKeyUsage=emailProtection → purposes reports smimesign enabled (verified empirically).
  3. Sink: $email_name = str_replace('@','__', trim(CN)); file_put_contents(NV_ROOTDIR.'/data/certs/'.$email_name.'.{key,crt,pem}', <attacker PEM>) (:269-287). Guard: none between CN and sink (only @→__). Bypass proof: grep shows str_replace is the sole transform; ..,/,. pass through (empirically CN=../../config/config → /data/certs/../../config/config.crt).
  4. Impact: arbitrary-directory file write (existing dirs, .crt/.key/.pem, attacker PEM content). Unconditional: corrupt DKIM signing key / cert assets (I:H, A:L). Conditional (curl.cainfo empty): overwrite cacert.pem → outbound-TLS MITM (adds C:L).

Bypass Evidence

  • grep of smtp.php :244-296 for basename|realpath|preg_match|nv_is_file|nv_check|in_array|dirname|strpos|escape → only match is str_replace('@','__') at :269.
  • Empirically verified (OpenSSL 3 + PHP): CN=../../config/config survives openssl_x509_parse verbatim; resolved write lands at config/config.crt (outside data/certs); purposes_enabled includes smimesign.
  • Version: git log 4.6.00..HEAD -- admin/settings/smtp.php empty (identical on latest tag and HEAD); pattern present since 4.5.00. The prior path-traversal fix (commit 27ba63c32) touches only modules/comment/admin/edit.php + install/tpl/step1.tpl — NOT smtp.php.

Affected Versions

>= 4.5.00, <= 4.6.00 (S/MIME cert feature introduced in commit d1f74a5be, first shipped in 4.5.00; code byte-identical through latest tag 4.6.00 and HEAD).

Suggested Fix

Apply basename() to the CN-derived name, or validate it with nv_is_file / a strict ^[A-Za-z0-9._@-]+$ allowlist before building the .key/.crt/.pem paths — the same nv_is_file containment the prior fix added to the comment module.

--- Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use

Affected versions

References

GitHub · nukeviet/nukeviet