Remote Code Execution via unrestricted custom field validation callback in the users module
Description
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
The users module lets an administrator define custom profile fields. When a field uses the callback validation type, the supplied function name (func_callback) was accepted after only a function_exists() check — with no allow-list and no restriction on which functions may be used.
As a result, a function such as system, exec, shell_exec or passthru could be stored as the field's validator. The value is later passed to call_user_func($func_callback, $value) in modules/users/fields.check.php when the field is submitted (e.g. via editinfo, register, or admin edit), causing arbitrary command execution on the server under the web-server account (e.g. www-data).
Type: Unsafe reflection / code injection leading to OS command execution (RCE).
Who is impacted / preconditions:
- Creating a malicious callback field requires the users module field-management privilege, which is gated behind super-administrator access (
NV_IS_SPADMIN) — it is not reachable by a low-privilege admin or a normal user. - Once such a field exists, the callback runs whenever the field is validated (including by unprivileged users), but the trust boundary that is crossed is super-admin → OS command execution as the web user, not root and not an anonymous-to-admin escalation.
Because exploitation requires an already highly-trusted super-administrator and execution is confined to the unprivileged web account, the real-world severity is Medium, not critical.
- CVSS 3.1:
AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H= 7.2 (High)
Patches
Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?
Yes. Validation of func_callback is now enforced against an explicit allow-list at write time. A callback function is only stored when it both exists and is declared in a new site configuration whitelist:
// config.php
$global_config['user_field_callbacks'] = ['your_validator_1', 'your_validator_2'];If the supplied function is not on the list, the callback is discarded and the field falls back to no validation, so a dangerous function such as system can no longer be attached to a field through the admin form. The admin field form also shows an on-screen note explaining that a callback must first be declared in config.php.
Users should upgrade to the patched release of NukeViet 4.6 that includes this change (or apply the corresponding commit).
Workarounds
Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?
- Restrict super-administrator accounts. Only site super-admins can create/modify custom fields; limiting and monitoring these accounts removes the attack surface.
- Audit existing data. Inspect the module field table (e.g.
nv4_users_fieldand the*_fieldtable of any module using this feature) for rows wherematch_type = 'callback', and remove or correct anyfunc_callbackthat is not a legitimate boolean-returning validator (e.g.system,exec,shell_exec,passthru,assert,call_user_func, etc.). This matters even after upgrading, because the fix validates at write time; a malicious value already present in the database must be cleaned manually. - Harden the runtime. Disable dangerous PHP functions via
disable_functionsinphp.ini(e.g.system,exec,shell_exec,passthru,proc_open,popen) so that even an attacker-supplied callback cannot spawn OS commands.
References
Are there any links users can visit to find out more?
- Sink:
modules/users/fields.check.php—call_user_func($row_f['func_callback'], $value) - Source / fix location:
modules/users/admin/fields.php—func_callbackhandling on field save - Configuration whitelist:
config.php—$global_config['user_field_callbacks']
CWE
- CWE-470: Use of Externally-Controlled Input to Select Classes or Code ('Unsafe Reflection')
- CWE-94: Improper Control of Generation of Code ('Code Injection')
- (related) CWE-749: Exposed Dangerous Method or Function