# GHSA-GJ7R-P794-HHQ5: Kubeshark: MCP download\_file writes fetched bytes to an unvalidated destination path

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: medium (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-16
- Modified: 2026-11-16

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-129235](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-129235.md): Kubeshark arbitrary file write in MCP download\_file tool

## Affected versions

- github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (Go): from 0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0, fixed in 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75

## Description

**Ecosystem / package:** Go — `github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark` (the `kubeshark`
CLI, `kubeshark mcp` subcommand)
**Affected component:** `cmd/mcpRunner.go`, MCP tool `download_file`
**Affected versions:** `>= v53.1.0`, `< v53.4.0` (the flaw shipped with the
tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release)
**Patched version:** `v53.4.0`
**Credit:** novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.

## Summary
The `download_file` MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied `path` from the Kubeshark
Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied `dest` on the local
filesystem with no validation of `dest`. An attacker who can influence the MCP
tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving
`kubeshark mcp` — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path
writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. `~/.ssh/authorized_keys`,
`~/.kube/config`, `~/.bashrc`), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints.
`download_file` is registered unconditionally (available in the default,
non-`--allow-destructive` posture).

## Introduced in
Commit `eb7dc42b` — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)",
2026-03-04 — first released in **v53.1.0** (`v53.1.0~1`). An earlier attempt
(`dbfd17d9`) was reverted (`a46f05c4`) before any release, so no tag before
v53.1.0 is affected.

## Details
In `callDownloadFile` (`cmd/mcpRunner.go`), both `path` and `dest` come straight
from the tool arguments:
- `dest` was passed directly to `os.Create(dest)` with no confinement — no
  `filepath.Clean`, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute
  paths or `../` traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.
- `path` was concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any
  Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.

## Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication
gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now
forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and
rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. **But**
the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default
`kubeshark tap` the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic
(credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing
Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is **not**
part of this advisory's fix.

## Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install:
`export_snapshot_pcap` → obtain a relative path → `download_file` with that
`path` and an attacker-chosen `dest`. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic
PCAP and recovered a planted canary `Authorization: Bearer …` credential from
it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.

## Impact
- **Integrity (local):** arbitrary file write on the machine running
  `kubeshark mcp`, as that user.
- **Confidentiality:** read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic
  (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).

## Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this **5.3 Medium**, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:

- **`AV:N` → `AV:L`.** The vulnerable component has no network listener the
  attacker reaches. `kubeshark mcp` is a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's
  input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then
  replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross
  a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine.
- **`I:H` → `I:L`.** The write is confined to paths writable by the user running
  `kubeshark mcp` (normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user
  modification. The attacker also controls *where* the bytes land, not *what*
  they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is
  constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated.
- **`A:L` → `A:N`.** Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the
  Hub, or the host; the original `A:L` is unsupported.

Kubeshark kept **`C:H`**: on a default community install the Hub API answers
unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely
readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept **`AC:H`** (the attacker must land an injection in
content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), **`PR:N`**
(`download_file` is registered unconditionally — no `--allow-destructive`
needed), **`UI:R`** (an operator must be driving an agent against
`kubeshark mcp`), and **`S:U`** (the impact stays within the local user's
authorization scope).

## Patches
Fixed in **v53.4.0** by commit
[`a76a1920`](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214)
(PR [#1957](https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957)).

Changes in `cmd/mcpRunner.go`:
- `dest` is resolved through `secureDownloadDest` and confined to a base
  directory (the CWD by default, relocatable via `KUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR`);
  a `dest` that resolves outside the base (via `../` or an absolute path) is
  rejected.
- `path` is rejected if it contains `..` segments.
- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked
  subdirectory inside the base (or a `dest` that is itself a symlink) cannot
  redirect the write outside it; the file is opened with `O_NOFOLLOW` where the
  platform provides it.
- Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the
  gated-auth refactor).

## Workarounds
- Run `kubeshark mcp` as an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory.
- Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (`AUTH_ENABLED=true` + an IdP/license) to close the
  unauthenticated read path.

## Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub `path` (current fix only rejects `..`).
- Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).

## References

- https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/security/advisories/GHSA-gj7r-p794-hhq5
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-129235
- https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/pull/1957
- https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/commit/a76a1920dc7587be700a17f1592f58a9512ad214
- https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark
- https://github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark/releases/tag/v53.4.0

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-GJ7R-P794-HHQ5
