- Database
- GitHub
- Severity
- medium
- Published
- Modified
Description
Ecosystem / package: Go — github.com/kubeshark/kubeshark (the kubeshark CLI, kubeshark mcp subcommand) Affected component: cmd/mcpRunner.go, MCP tool download_file Affected versions: >= v53.1.0, < v53.4.0 (the flaw shipped with the tool's first release; v53.3.0 was the last affected release) Patched version: v53.4.0 Credit: novice-22 (Urim), via private coordinated disclosure.
Summary
The download_file MCP tool fetches a caller-supplied path from the Kubeshark Hub API and writes the response body to a caller-supplied dest on the local filesystem with no validation of dest. An attacker who can influence the MCP tool arguments — e.g. via indirect prompt injection against an AI agent driving kubeshark mcp — can write attacker-controlled bytes to an arbitrary path writable by the user running the MCP server (e.g. ~/.ssh/authorized_keys, ~/.kube/config, ~/.bashrc), and can request arbitrary Hub API endpoints. download_file is registered unconditionally (available in the default, non---allow-destructive posture).
Introduced in
Commit eb7dc42b — "Add get_file_url and download_file MCP tools (#1853)", 2026-03-04 — first released in v53.1.0 (v53.1.0~1). An earlier attempt (dbfd17d9) was reverted (a46f05c4) before any release, so no tag before v53.1.0 is affected.
Details
In callDownloadFile (cmd/mcpRunner.go), both path and dest come straight from the tool arguments:
destwas passed directly toos.Create(dest)with no confinement — nofilepath.Clean, no base-directory containment, no rejection of absolute paths or../traversal. Any path the process can write is reachable.pathwas concatenated onto the Hub API base URL with no allowlist, so any Hub endpoint (including captured-traffic exports) is reachable.
Auth context (CWE-306 / CWE-200)
The tool originally issued the fetch with no authentication. The authentication gap was addressed by the gated-Hub authentication refactor: the download now forwards the operator's Hub credentials (ServiceAccount token / License-Key) and rejects auth-required responses instead of writing a login page to disk. But the Hub ships auth-disabled by default (community/dev), so on a default kubeshark tap the Hub API answers without authentication and captured traffic (credentials/tokens/PII) can still be read and exfiltrated end-to-end. Enforcing Hub auth by default is tracked separately (gated-auth workstream) and is not part of this advisory's fix.
Proof of concept (reporter, abridged)
Following the tool's documented workflow on a default community install: export_snapshot_pcap → obtain a relative path → download_file with that path and an attacker-chosen dest. The reporter retrieved a captured-traffic PCAP and recovered a planted canary Authorization: Bearer … credential from it, and demonstrated writing the fetched bytes to an arbitrary local path.
Impact
- Integrity (local): arbitrary file write on the machine running
kubeshark mcp, as that user. - Confidentiality: read of Hub API endpoints, incl. captured network traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) on a default (auth-disabled) install.
- Reliable RCE is not demonstrated (script endpoints are JSON-wrapped).
Severity rationale
Kubeshark scores this 5.3 Medium, down from the reporter's 7.1, on two metrics:
- `AV:N` → `AV:L`. The vulnerable component has no network listener the attacker reaches.
kubeshark mcpis a local stdio MCP server; the attacker's input arrives as content an agent running on that host ingests and then replays into a local tool call. The delivery of the poisoned content may cross a network, but the attack surface being exploited is local to the machine. - `I:H` → `I:L`. The write is confined to paths writable by the user running
kubeshark mcp(normally unprivileged) — no system-file or other-user modification. The attacker also controls where the bytes land, not what they are: the body comes from a Hub API response, so the content is constrained to what the Hub will emit. Reliable RCE was not demonstrated. - `A:L` → `A:N`. Nothing in the issue degrades availability of the CLI, the Hub, or the host; the original
A:Lis unsupported.
Kubeshark kept `C:H`: on a default community install the Hub API answers unauthenticated, so captured traffic (credentials, tokens, PII) is genuinely readable end-to-end. Kubeshark kept `AC:H` (the attacker must land an injection in content the agent ingests and know the deployment layout), `PR:N` (download_file is registered unconditionally — no --allow-destructive needed), `UI:R` (an operator must be driving an agent against kubeshark mcp), and `S:U` (the impact stays within the local user's authorization scope).
Patches
Fixed in v53.4.0 by commit a76a1920 (PR #1957).
Changes in cmd/mcpRunner.go:
destis resolved throughsecureDownloadDestand confined to a base directory (the CWD by default, relocatable viaKUBESHARK_MCP_DOWNLOAD_DIR); adestthat resolves outside the base (via../or an absolute path) is rejected.pathis rejected if it contains..segments.- Containment is re-checked after resolving symlinks, so a symlinked subdirectory inside the base (or a
destthat is itself a symlink) cannot redirect the write outside it; the file is opened withO_NOFOLLOWwhere the platform provides it. - Credential forwarding + auth-required detection on the fetch (shipped in the gated-auth refactor).
Workarounds
- Run
kubeshark mcpas an unprivileged user in an isolated working directory. - Do not expose the MCP server to untrusted content / untrusted agent inputs.
- Enable Hub authentication (
AUTH_ENABLED=true+ an IdP/license) to close the unauthenticated read path.
Follow-ups (not blocking this advisory)
- Strict prefix allowlist for the Hub
path(current fix only rejects..). - Hub-side default auth enforcement (gated-auth workstream).
Affected versions
From 0.0.2-0.20260304171723-eb7dc42b6ea0 · fixed in 0.0.2-0.20260812200004-a76a1920dc75