- Database
- GitHub
- Severity
- Medium
- Published
- Modified
Description
In Kiwi TCMS version 16.1, the fix for CVE-2026-54724 (open redirect via unvalidated next parameter) in the account confirmation endpoint is incomplete. The validation uses startswith("/") to check if the redirect URL is local, but this is bypassed by protocol-relative URLs like //evil.com which start with / but redirect the browser to an external attacker-controlled domain. 16.1’s incomplete mitigation still allows protocol-relative destinations and earlier releases lack the mitigation.
Vulnerable Code
In tcms/kiwi_auth/views.py, the Confirm view (line ~113):
def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs): self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index")) if not self.url.startswith("/"): self.url = reverse("core-views-index")
The check startswith("/") passes for //evil.com because it begins with /, but browsers interpret //evil.com as a protocol-relative URL that redirects to https://evil.com (or http://evil.com depending on the current page's protocol).
Proof of Concept
GET /confirm/<activation_key>/?next=//evil.com/phishing HTTP/1.1 Host: kiwi.example.com
Response:
HTTP/1.1 302 Found Location: //evil.com/phishing
The browser follows the redirect to https://evil.com/phishing.
Verification:
>>> url = "//evil.com/phishing" >>> url.startswith("/") True # passes the check!
Impact
An attacker can craft a confirmation link that, after the user confirms their account, redirects them to a phishing page. This is useful for:
- Credential phishing (fake login page on attacker domain)
- Malware delivery after trusted action
- Social engineering (user trusts the link because it's from the legitimate Kiwi TCMS instance)
The attack requires sending a crafted activation link to a user who is registering, or intercepting/predicting the activation key.
Suggested Fix
Use Django's url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme() utility instead of a simple startswith check:
from django.utils.http import url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme
def get_redirect_url(self, *args, **kwargs): self.url = self.request.GET.get("next", reverse("core-views-index")) if not url_has_allowed_host_and_scheme( self.url, allowed_hosts={self.request.get_host()}, require_https=self.request.is_secure(), ): self.url = reverse("core-views-index")
This properly rejects protocol-relative URLs, absolute URLs to other hosts, and other bypass patterns.
Fixed in Version 16.2
Affected versions
- kiwitcmsPyPI
through 12.4