# GHSA-CP55-WMV6-WXPP: Stored XSS in NukeViet CMS via SVG upload: the sanitizer is blind to markup hidden inside an internal DTD entity

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: CVSS 9.3 (Critical)
- Published: 2026-10-02
- Modified: 2026-10-02

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-94567](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-94567.md): NukeViet stored XSS in SVG upload sanitizer

## Affected versions

- nukeviet/nukeviet (Packagist): through 4.5.11

## Description

### Impact

This is a **stored cross-site scripting (XSS)** vulnerability. An uploaded SVG can carry a `<script>` element hidden inside an internal DTD entity; the server-side sanitizer never sees it, stores the file byte-for-byte, and serves it as `image/svg+xml`, so the script executes in the site's own origin when the file URL is opened in a browser.

The SVG sanitizer `sanitize_svg_dom()` enumerates elements with `DOMXPath::query('//*')` and rejects any tag outside an allow-list, so a plain scripted SVG is correctly blocked. The check is bypassed by declaring the script inside an internal DTD entity, because `DOMDocument` is loaded **without** `LIBXML_NOENT`; libxml therefore keeps the reference as a `DOMEntityReference` node (node type 5, not an element), `//*` never returns the `<script>`, and the file passes validation. Browsers parsing `image/svg+xml` do expand internal entities, so a real `<script>` element materialises client-side.

A second defect turns the DOM walker into a single point of failure: for SVG uploads `check_tmpfile()` returns the result of `check_svg_tmpfile()` before ever calling `verify_image()`, so the raw-byte screen that greps for a literal `<script>` never runs on an SVG - its `if ($svg and preg_match(...))` branch is unreachable because no caller passes `$svg = true`. Finally, the admin upload handler skips all image re-processing when the file is an SVG, so the attacker's exact bytes are what land on disk.

Who is impacted: any site running an affected version that accepts SVG uploads. The most severe entry point is **unauthenticated**: when a module's comment feature is opened to the "All" or "Guest" group (a standard, supported option for public sites) and comment attachments are enabled (`allowattachcomm`), a guest with no account can upload the SVG, because the default extension set includes the `images` group and the `images` group includes `svg`. The same applies to any front-end submission flow whose plan permits image uploads. In addition, the admin file manager (`nv=upload&op=upload`) is reachable by **any module admin** - site-admin is not required - which makes this also a privilege-escalation path from module admin to site admin. In all cases the stored file runs with the victim's session: sending the `/uploads/...svg` link to an administrator lets the payload run with that administrator's authority. There is no Content-Security-Policy and no `Content-Disposition` on the uploads directory to contain it (`X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` does not stop `image/svg+xml` from executing script).

### Details

Root cause is a parser-differential (CWE-436): the sanitizer and the browser interpret the same bytes differently. The sanitizer parses without entity expansion and sees only `<svg>` and `<rect>`; the browser expands `&payload;` into a live `<script>` element. Because the sanitized document is stored verbatim (no re-serialisation) and the raw-byte fallback is dead code for SVG, nothing else catches the smuggled markup.

Affected code (package `vinades/nukeviet`, file `Files/Upload.php`):

- `check_tmpfile()` returns `check_svg_tmpfile()` on the SVG path before reaching `verify_image()`.
- `check_svg_tmpfile()` calls `$dom->load($tmp_name, LIBXML_NONET)` without `LIBXML_NOENT`, then walks the DOM with `//*`.
- `verify_image()`'s `if ($svg and preg_match('#</*(applet|link|script|...)#'))` branch is never reached because both call sites use the default `$svg = false`.

### Proof of concept

Payload (`poc.svg`):

```xml
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
  <!ENTITY payload "<script>alert('XSS on '+document.domain)</script>">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="200" height="200" viewBox="0 0 200 200">
  <rect width="200" height="200" fill="#eee"/>
  &payload;
</svg>
```

1. Upload the file through the admin file manager (`POST /admin/index.php?nv=upload&op=upload`, `type=image`) as any module admin, or via a front-end comment/banner attachment where enabled. It is accepted and stored unchanged.
2. Control test: the identical script written as a plain `<script>` element is rejected - proving the entity, not "SVG scripts are allowed", is the bypass.
3. Open `/uploads/<name>.svg` directly in a browser: the internal entity expands into a real `<script>` element and executes in the site's origin (confirmed reading `document.domain`).

### Patches

Yes. Fixed in commit `b4abcddd3` on the `nukeviet4.6` branch; the change is listed in `CHANGELOG.txt` under NukeViet 4.6.02. Users should update to the release that contains this commit (NukeViet 4.6.02 or later). Because the vulnerable code lives in the `vinades/nukeviet` Composer package, sites that vendor it should also update the package, not only the CMS tree.

The fix, all inside `check_svg_tmpfile()`:

1. Reject any SVG that declares a `DOCTYPE` (`$dom->doctype !== null`). SVGs used as site assets have no legitimate need for an internal DTD subset; this removes the ability to declare entities at all and also blocks XXE.
2. Re-serialise the sanitised DOM back to disk (`saveXML()` + `file_put_contents()`), so what is stored equals what was validated (no smuggling via comments, CDATA, or trailing bytes).
3. Restore the raw-byte defence-in-depth screen on the SVG path by calling `verify_image($tmp_name, true)`, reviving the previously dead `$svg = true` branch.

A related compatibility fix was applied at the same time: the parse was switched from `DOMDocument::load($file)` to `file_get_contents()` + `DOMDocument::loadXML($content)`, because on PHP 7.x `libxml_disable_entity_loader(true)` makes `load()` unable to read the file (file I/O goes through the same entity loader that was just disabled), which caused all SVG uploads to fail. `loadXML()` takes the string directly and is not affected; the security posture is unchanged (no `LIBXML_NOENT`, no `LIBXML_DTDLOAD`, `LIBXML_NONET` set, entity loader still disabled on PHP 7.x), and XXE via a `SYSTEM` entity was verified not to leak file contents on PHP 7.4 / 8.2 / 8.5.

### Workarounds

For users who cannot update immediately:

- Remove `svg` from the allowed upload types - in the admin upload configuration and in the extension groups used by comment attachments and banner plans (the `images` group in `includes/ini/mime.ini` contains `svg`).
- Serve the uploads directory with `Content-Disposition: attachment` for `.svg` files and/or a restrictive `Content-Security-Policy`, so SVGs are downloaded rather than rendered inline and any script is contained.
- Restrict who can upload: disable front-end comment/banner attachments (`allowattachcomm` and banner upload plans) and review which accounts hold module-admin rights.

### References

- Fix commit: `b4abcddd3` ("Fix a security vulnerability in the SVG file upload"), branch `nukeviet4.6`.
- Affected file: `vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Files/Upload.php` (`check_tmpfile()`, `check_svg_tmpfile()`, `sanitize_svg_dom()`, `verify_image()`).
- CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting).
- CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type.
- CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict.

## References

- https://github.com/nukeviet/nukeviet/security/advisories/GHSA-cp55-wmv6-wxpp

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-CP55-WMV6-WXPP
