Stored XSS in NukeViet CMS via SVG upload: the sanitizer is blind to markup hidden inside an internal DTD entity
Description
Impact
This is a stored cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability. An uploaded SVG can carry a <script> element hidden inside an internal DTD entity; the server-side sanitizer never sees it, stores the file byte-for-byte, and serves it as image/svg+xml, so the script executes in the site's own origin when the file URL is opened in a browser.
The SVG sanitizer sanitize_svg_dom() enumerates elements with DOMXPath::query('//*') and rejects any tag outside an allow-list, so a plain scripted SVG is correctly blocked. The check is bypassed by declaring the script inside an internal DTD entity, because DOMDocument is loaded without LIBXML_NOENT; libxml therefore keeps the reference as a DOMEntityReference node (node type 5, not an element), //* never returns the <script>, and the file passes validation. Browsers parsing image/svg+xml do expand internal entities, so a real <script> element materialises client-side.
A second defect turns the DOM walker into a single point of failure: for SVG uploads check_tmpfile() returns the result of check_svg_tmpfile() before ever calling verify_image(), so the raw-byte screen that greps for a literal <script> never runs on an SVG - its if ($svg and preg_match(...)) branch is unreachable because no caller passes $svg = true. Finally, the admin upload handler skips all image re-processing when the file is an SVG, so the attacker's exact bytes are what land on disk.
Who is impacted: any site running an affected version that accepts SVG uploads. The most severe entry point is unauthenticated: when a module's comment feature is opened to the "All" or "Guest" group (a standard, supported option for public sites) and comment attachments are enabled (allowattachcomm), a guest with no account can upload the SVG, because the default extension set includes the images group and the images group includes svg. The same applies to any front-end submission flow whose plan permits image uploads. In addition, the admin file manager (nv=upload&op=upload) is reachable by any module admin - site-admin is not required - which makes this also a privilege-escalation path from module admin to site admin. In all cases the stored file runs with the victim's session: sending the /uploads/...svg link to an administrator lets the payload run with that administrator's authority. There is no Content-Security-Policy and no Content-Disposition on the uploads directory to contain it (X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff does not stop image/svg+xml from executing script).
Details
Root cause is a parser-differential (CWE-436): the sanitizer and the browser interpret the same bytes differently. The sanitizer parses without entity expansion and sees only <svg> and <rect>; the browser expands &payload; into a live <script> element. Because the sanitized document is stored verbatim (no re-serialisation) and the raw-byte fallback is dead code for SVG, nothing else catches the smuggled markup.
Affected code (package vinades/nukeviet, file Files/Upload.php):
check_tmpfile()returnscheck_svg_tmpfile()on the SVG path before reachingverify_image().check_svg_tmpfile()calls$dom->load($tmp_name, LIBXML_NONET)withoutLIBXML_NOENT, then walks the DOM with//*.verify_image()'sif ($svg and preg_match('#</*(applet|link|script|...)#'))branch is never reached because both call sites use the default$svg = false.
Proof of concept
Payload (poc.svg):
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE svg [
<!ENTITY payload "<script>alert('XSS on '+document.domain)</script>">
]>
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="200" height="200" viewBox="0 0 200 200">
<rect width="200" height="200" fill="#eee"/>
&payload;
</svg>- Upload the file through the admin file manager (
POST /admin/index.php?nv=upload&op=upload,type=image) as any module admin, or via a front-end comment/banner attachment where enabled. It is accepted and stored unchanged. - Control test: the identical script written as a plain
<script>element is rejected - proving the entity, not "SVG scripts are allowed", is the bypass. - Open
/uploads/<name>.svgdirectly in a browser: the internal entity expands into a real<script>element and executes in the site's origin (confirmed readingdocument.domain).
Patches
Yes. Fixed in commit b4abcddd3 on the nukeviet4.6 branch; the change is listed in CHANGELOG.txt under NukeViet 4.6.02. Users should update to the release that contains this commit (NukeViet 4.6.02 or later). Because the vulnerable code lives in the vinades/nukeviet Composer package, sites that vendor it should also update the package, not only the CMS tree.
The fix, all inside check_svg_tmpfile():
- Reject any SVG that declares a
DOCTYPE($dom->doctype !== null). SVGs used as site assets have no legitimate need for an internal DTD subset; this removes the ability to declare entities at all and also blocks XXE. - Re-serialise the sanitised DOM back to disk (
saveXML()+file_put_contents()), so what is stored equals what was validated (no smuggling via comments, CDATA, or trailing bytes). - Restore the raw-byte defence-in-depth screen on the SVG path by calling
verify_image($tmp_name, true), reviving the previously dead$svg = truebranch.
A related compatibility fix was applied at the same time: the parse was switched from DOMDocument::load($file) to file_get_contents() + DOMDocument::loadXML($content), because on PHP 7.x libxml_disable_entity_loader(true) makes load() unable to read the file (file I/O goes through the same entity loader that was just disabled), which caused all SVG uploads to fail. loadXML() takes the string directly and is not affected; the security posture is unchanged (no LIBXML_NOENT, no LIBXML_DTDLOAD, LIBXML_NONET set, entity loader still disabled on PHP 7.x), and XXE via a SYSTEM entity was verified not to leak file contents on PHP 7.4 / 8.2 / 8.5.
Workarounds
For users who cannot update immediately:
- Remove
svgfrom the allowed upload types - in the admin upload configuration and in the extension groups used by comment attachments and banner plans (theimagesgroup inincludes/ini/mime.inicontainssvg). - Serve the uploads directory with
Content-Disposition: attachmentfor.svgfiles and/or a restrictiveContent-Security-Policy, so SVGs are downloaded rather than rendered inline and any script is contained. - Restrict who can upload: disable front-end comment/banner attachments (
allowattachcommand banner upload plans) and review which accounts hold module-admin rights.
References
- Fix commit:
b4abcddd3("Fix a security vulnerability in the SVG file upload"), branchnukeviet4.6. - Affected file:
vendor/vinades/nukeviet/Files/Upload.php(check_tmpfile(),check_svg_tmpfile(),sanitize_svg_dom(),verify_image()). - CWE-79: Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (Cross-site Scripting).
- CWE-434: Unrestricted Upload of File with Dangerous Type.
- CWE-436: Interpretation Conflict.