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NukeViet 4.6.00: Login Lockout Bypass via Untrusted Forwarded-IP Headers

GHSA-CCF2-6MF6-J78JPublished Updated GitHub

Description

NukeViet 4.6.00 unconditionally trusts client-controlled proxy headers, including X-Forwarded-For, when determining the client IP. It does not verify that the request came from a trusted reverse proxy.

An unauthenticated attacker can therefore rotate the header to bypass the built-in login-attempt blocker. The same spoofable IP is also used by admin and API IP restrictions, IP bans, flood protection, and security logging.

Affected Version

  • Version: NukeViet 4.6.00
  • Commit: f47de5cd6577d0d49449754be9bafe9081be4981
  • Authentication: Not required

Root Cause

Ips.php accepts HTTP_CLIENT_IP, HTTP_X_FORWARDED_FOR, and similar headers before falling back to the connection's REMOTE_ADDR. There is no trusted-proxy check.

NV_CLIENT_IP is then used as the key for the login blocker in admin_login.php and modules/users/funcs/login.php.

Reproduction

From WSL, place the supplied Bash PoC in the current directory and run:

bash ./nukeviet_xff_lockout_poc.sh \
  http://localhost/admin/

nukeviet_xff_lockout_poc.sh

The script uses a randomly generated nonexistent username. It does not attempt to access a real account.

Verified Result

The following result was reproduced from WSL against NukeViet 4.6.00. With X-Forwarded-For: 203.0.113.203, the installation returned:

attempt=1 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200
attempt=2 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200
attempt=3 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200
attempt=4 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200
attempt=5 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200
attempt=6 blocked=true incorrect=false status=200

Changing only the header to X-Forwarded-For: 203.0.113.204 immediately restored login attempts:

rotated_ip=203.0.113.204 blocked=false incorrect=true status=200

<img width="1380" height="904" alt="xff" src="github.com/user-attachments/assets/c61592f1-3dce-482f-8660-0804f58e18e5" />

The TCP source and target were unchanged. This confirms that an unauthenticated attacker can evade the lockout by supplying a new header value for every attempt.

Impact

  • Verified impact: bypass of administrator login lockout, enabling effectively unlimited password-guessing attempts from one source by rotating X-Forwarded-For.
  • Additional code-level exposure: the spoofable IP is also consumed by user-login controls, IP restrictions, bans, flood controls, and security logging. These additional consequences were not dynamically demonstrated by this PoC.

This is a product-level trust issue, not merely a missing proxy configuration option: NukeViet trusts the headers even when the request is received directly.

Remediation

  • Use REMOTE_ADDR by default.
  • Accept forwarded client-IP headers only when REMOTE_ADDR belongs to an explicitly configured trusted proxy.
  • Parse proxy chains from right to left and select the first untrusted address.
  • Ensure rate limits and security logs retain the socket peer address in addition to any validated forwarded address.

Affected versions

References

GitHub · nukeviet/nukeviet